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Abstract
We derive, in the classical framework of Bayesian sensitivity analysis, optimal
lower and upper bounds on posterior values obtained from Bayesian models that ex-
actly capture an arbitrarily large number of finite-dimensional marginals of the data-
generating distribution and/or that are as close as desired to the data-generating
distribution in the Prokhorov or total variation metrics; these bounds show that
such models may still make the largest possible prediction error after conditioning
on an arbitrarily large number of sample data measured at finite precision. These re-
sults are obtained through the development of a reduction calculus for optimization
problems over measures on spaces of measures. We use this calculus to investigate
the mechanisms that generate brittleness/robustness and, in particular, we observe
that learning and robustness are antagonistic properties. It is now well understood
that the numerical resolution of PDEs requires the satisfaction of specific stability
conditions. Is there a missing stability condition for using Bayesian inference in a
continuous world under finite information?
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1 Introduction
With the advent of high-performance computing, Bayesian methods are increasingly
popular tools for the quantification of uncertainty throughout science and industry.
Since these methods impact the making of sometimes critical decisions in increasingly
complicated contexts, the sensitivity of their posterior conclusions with respect to the
underlying models and prior beliefs is becoming a pressing question.
While it is known that Bayesian methods are robust and consistent when the number
of possible outcomes is finite, the exploration of Bayesian inference in a continuous world
has revealed both positive [19, 30, 38, 67, 69, 92, 96] and negative results [12, 13, 35,
47, 48, 61, 71]. One contribution of this paper is the development of a calculus for the
elucidation of the mechanisms generating robustness or brittleness in Bayesian inference.
In particular, this paper
1. shows that the process of Bayesian conditioning on data at fine enough resolution
is sensitive (as defined in [94], modulo a small technicality) with respect to the
underlying distributions, under the total variation and Prokhorov metrics; and
2. raises the question of a missing stability condition for using Bayesian inference in
a continuous world under finite information, somewhat akin to the CFL condition
for the stability of a discrete numerical scheme used to approximate a continuous
PDE.
Point (1) is the source of negative results similar to those caused by tail properties in
statistics [8, 37], and can be seen as an extreme occurrence of the dilation phenomenon
from robust Bayesian inference [103].
Let us now illustrate the main question explored in this paper with a simple example
of Bayesian reasoning in action:
Problem 1. There is a bag containing 102 coins, one of which always lands on heads,
while the other 101 are perfectly fair. One coin is picked uniformly at random from the
bag, flipped 10 times, and 10 heads are obtained. What is the probability that this coin
is the unfair coin?
The correct probability is given by applying Bayes’ theorem:
P[A|B] = P[B|A]P[A]
P[B]
=
1
1 + 101× 2−10 ≈ 0.91, (1.1)
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where A is the event “the coin is the unfair coin” and B is the event “10 heads are
observed”. If the number of coins is not known exactly and the supposedly fair coins are
not exactly fair, then Bayes’ theorem can be used to produce a robust Bayesian inference
in the following sense: if the fair coins are slightly unbalanced and the probability of
getting a tail is 0.51, and an estimate of 100 coins is used and an estimate 12 of the
fairness of the fair coins is used, then the resulting estimate 1
1+99×2−10 is still a good
approximation of the correct answer.
Does this robustness hold when the underlying probability space is continuous or an
approximation thereof? For example, what if the random outcomes are decimal numbers
— perhaps given to finite precision — rather than heads or tails?
1.1 The General Question
To investigate these questions in a general context let us now consider the situation in
which the space X where observations/samples take their values is no longer {Head,Tail}
but an arbitrary Polish space (with the real line R as a prototypical example). Write
M(X ) for the set of probability measures on X and let Φ: M(X ) → R be a function1
defining a quantity of interest. When X is the real line R, a prototypical example is
Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], the probability that the random variable X distributed according to
µ exceeds the threshold value a; another typical example is Φ(µ) := Eµ[X], the mean of
X.
Problem 2. Let the data-generating distribution µ† ∈ M(X ) be an unknown or par-
tially known probability measure on X . The objective is to estimate Φ(µ†) from the
observation of n i.i.d. samples from µ†, which we denote by d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ X n.
For practical reasons (and to avoid problems associated with conditioning with re-
spect to events of measure zero) we will assume that the data is observed up to resolu-
tion/precision δ > 0, i.e. what we actually observe in Problem 2 is the event d ∈ Bnδ ,
where Bnδ :=
∏n
i=1Bδ(xi), (x1, . . . , xn) is a fixed point of X n, and Bδ(x) is the open ball
of radius δ and center x (defined with respect to a consistent metric on the Polish space
X ).
Now observe that the Bayesian answer to Problem 2 is to assume that µ† is the
realization of some random measure µ onM(X ). This is done by choosing a model class
A ⊆ M(X ) and a probability measure pi ∈ M(A) which we call the prior. This prior
determines the randomness with which a representative µ ∈ A is selected, and for each
such µ ∈ A, the generation of n i.i.d. samples d ∈ X n by randomly sampling from µn
naturally determines a product measure on A× X n. In analogy to Problem 1, A plays
the role of the bag of coins (measures) and each measure µ ∈ A plays the role of a coin.
Now the prior estimate of the quantity of interest is Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)] and the posterior
estimate is defined as the conditional expectation
Eµ∼pi,d∼µn [Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ ] (1.2)
1All spaces will be topological spaces, the term “function” will mean Borel measurable function and
“measure” will mean Borel measure.
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with respect to this product measure.
One response to the concern that the choice of prior pi is somewhat arbitrary is to
explore classes of priors. Indeed:
“Most statisticians would acknowledge that an analysis is not complete unless
the sensitivity of the conclusions to the assumptions is investigated. Yet, in
practice, such sensitivity analyses are rarely used. This is because sensitivity
analyses involve difficult computations that must often be tailored to the
specific problem. This is especially true in Bayesian inference where the
computations are already quite difficult.” [102]
In this paper we will investigate this approach, known as robust Bayesian inference
[15, 16, 25, 104] or Bayesian sensitivity analysis, and examine the robustness of Bayesian
inference by computing optimal bounds on prior and posterior values in terms of given
sets of priors. To do so, we need some definitions.
Definition 1.1. For a model class A ⊆M(X ), a quantity of interest Φ: A → R, and a
set of priors Π ⊆M(A), let
L(Π) := inf
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
U(Π) := sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the prior values of the quantity of interest.
For B ⊆ X n a non-empty open subset of the data space, let ΠB ⊆ Π be the subset of
priors pi such that the probability that d ∈ B is nonzero, i.e. Pµ∼pi,d∼µn [d ∈ B] > 0, and
let
L(Π|B) := inf
pi∈ΠB
Eµ∼pi,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
U(Π|B) := sup
pi∈ΠB
Eµ∼pi,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the posterior values of the quantity of
interest, given that d ∈ B.
1.2 Example of Brittleness Under Finite Information
As illustrated in Problem 1, it is already known from classical Bayesian sensitivity anal-
ysis that posterior values are robust if the random outcomes live in a finite space (i.e.
X is finite) or if the class of priors Π is finite-dimensional (i.e. if what one does not
know can be represented by a finite number of known parameters). One purpose of this
paper is to investigate what the very same classical Bayesian sensitivity analysis frame-
work would conclude in the presence of finite information (i.e. if for instance Π is finite
codimensional). To understand this question let us consider the following example:
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Example 1.2. Our purpose is to estimate the mean Φ(µ†) := Eµ† [X] of some random
variable X with respect to some unknown distribution µ† on the interval [0, 1] based on
the observation of n i.i.d. samples d := (d1, . . . , dn), given to finite resolution δ (i.e. we
observe d ∈ Bnδ , where Bnδ is the product of n open balls of radius δ), from the unknown
distribution µ†.
The Bayesian answer to that problem is to assume that µ† is the realization of
some random measure distributed according to some prior pi (i.e. µ ∼ pi) and then
compute the posterior value of the mean by conditioning on the data, i.e. compute
(1.2) with Φ(µ) := Eµ[X]. Observe that to specify the prior pi we need to specify the
distribution of all the moments2 of µ (i.e. the distribution of the infinite-dimensional
vector (Eµ[X],Eµ[X2],Eµ[X3], . . .)).
It is known, from classical robust Bayesian inference, that the posterior value (1.2)
is robust with respect to finite dimensional perturbations of the particular choice of
the prior pi. However, rather than specifying a finite-dimensional class of priors Π (i.e.
assuming infinite information), it appears epistemologically more reasonable to specify
a finite-codimensional Π (i.e. assume finite information) and a natural way to do so is
to specify the distribution Q of only a large, but finite, number of moments of µ (i.e. to
specify the distribution of (Eµ[X],Eµ[X2], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]), where k ∈ N can be arbitrarily
large). This defines a class of priors Π on M([0, 1]) such that if pi ∈ Π and µ ∼ pi then
(Eµ[X],Eµ[X2], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]) ∼ Q.
More precisely, writing Ψ as the function mapping each measure µ on [0, 1] to its
first k moments Ψ(µ) := (Eµ[X],Eµ[X2], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]) and choosing a measure Q on
Ψ
(M([0, 1])) ⊂ Rk, Π is simply defined as the pullback of the measure Q under Ψ, i.e.
writing A :=M([0, 1]),
Π := Ψ−1Q =
{
pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi = Q}.
One consequence of one of the main results of this paper, Theorem 4.13, is that no matter
how large k is, no matter how large the number of samples n is, for any Q that has a
density with respect to the uniform distribution on the first k moments, if you observe
the data at a fine enough resolution, then the minimum and maximum of the posterior
value of the mean over the class of priors Π are 0 and 1, i.e. the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 1.3. For all k ∈ N, if Q is absolutely continuous with respect to the uniform
distribution on Ψ
(M([0, 1])), then
lim
δ↓0
L(Π|Bnδ ) = 0 and lim
δ↓0
U(Π|Bnδ ) = 1
and the convergence holds uniformly in n.
2In fact, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to determine pi, since there are cases in
which the moment problem is indeterminate. See [3] for a full discussion of such issues.
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(a) fa(x, θ) (b) fb(x, θ)
Figure 1.1: Illustration of the density fa(x, θ) of model a and f b(x, θ) of model b.
This example of brittleness is derived from Theorem 4.13 (see Example 4.16), the
proof of which sheds light on the mechanism leading to brittleness in a general context
and shows that the pathology illustrated by Proposition (1.3) is general and inherent
to using Bayesian inference in continuous spaces (or their discretizations) under finite
information. Furthermore, although this simple example concerns the posterior mean,
the quantity of interest in Theorem 4.13 is arbitrary and the brittleness results apply to
the whole posterior distribution.
1.3 Example of Brittleness Under Infinitesimal Model Perturbations
Theorem 4.13 (and its corollary, Theorem 6.1), which leads to brittleness under finite
information as illustrated in the previous example, also leads to brittleness under in-
finitesimal model perturbations in the total variation and Prokhorov metrics. We will
now illustrate one mechanism causing brittleness with a simple example.
In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) = Eµ† [X] where µ† is an
unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1]) based on the observation of a
single data point d1 = 0.5 up to resolution δ (i.e. we observe d1 ∈ Bδ(x1) with x1 = 0.5).
Consider the following two Bayesian models (measures) µa(θ) and µb(θ) on the unit
interval [0, 1], parametrized by θ ∈ (0, 1), and with densities fa and f b given by
fa(x, θ) = (1− θ)(1 + 1θ)(1− x) 1θ + θ(1 + 11−θ)x 11−θ ,
f b(x, θ) =
{
fa(x, θ) 1Z
(
1{x 6∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )}
+ 10−91{x∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )}
)
, if θ < 0.999,
fa(x, θ), if θ ≥ 0.999,
where Z is a normalization constant (close to one) chosen so that
∫
[0,1] f
b(x, θ) dx = 1.
See Figure 1.1 for an illustration of these densities.
Observe that the density of model b is that of model a besides the small gap of
width δc > 0 created around the data point for model b (if θ < 0.999, see Figure 1.1);
since the data point is fixed at x1 =
1
2 , the total variation distance dTV
(
µa(θ), µb(θ)
)
between the two models is, uniformly over θ ∈ (0, 1), a constant times δc. Assuming that
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the prior distribution on θ is the uniform distribution on (0, 1), observe that the prior
value of the quantity of interest Eµ[X] under both models (a and b) is approximately
1
2 . Now, when θ is close to one (zero) then the density of model a puts most of its mass
towards one (zero). Observe also that the density of model b behaves in a similar way,
with the important exception that the probability of observing the data under model b
is infinitesimally small for θ < 0.999. Therefore, for δ < δc, the posterior value of the
quantity of interest Eµ[X] under model a is 12 whereas it is close to one under model b.
Observe also that a perturbed model c analogous to b would lead to a posterior value
close to zero.
This simple example of brittleness under infinitesimal model perturbations is derived
from the proof of Theorem 6.4, which shows that Bayesian posterior values are generally
brittle under infinitesimal perturbations of Bayesian models in TV and in Prokhorov
metrics.
µb(θ) is also a simple example of what worst priors can look like after a classical
Bayesian sensitivity analysis over a class of priors specified via constraints on the TV or
Prokhorov distance or the distribution of a finite number of moments.
Can we dismiss these worst priors because they depend on the data? The problem
with this argument is that in the context of Bayesian sensitivity analysis worst priors
always depend on (or are pre-adapted to) the data. Therefore the same argument would
lead to a dismissal of Bayesian sensitivity analysis and therefore the robust Bayesian
framework. Can we dismiss these worst priors because they depend too much on the
data? The problem with this argument is that it is not a transparent task to define
too much without introducing the following element of circular reasoning: the degree of
pre-adaptation determines the degree of brittleness, the framework is dismissed is when
the degree of pre-adaptation is “too much”, therefore the method cannot be brittle.
Can we dismiss these worst priors because they can “look nasty” and make the
probability of observing the data very small? The problem with this argument is that
these worst priors are not “isolated pathologies” but directions of instability and their
number increase with the number of data points. We will illustrate this point with
another simple example by placing a uniform constraint on the probability of observing
the data in the model class. We already know that if the data is equally likely under all
measures in the model class then posterior values are robust but learning is not possible
(prior and posterior values are equal). The following example will show that although
variations in the probability of the data in the model class make learning possible, they
also lead to brittleness.
1.4 Example of Learning vs Robustness
In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) = µ†[a, 1] for some a ∈ (0, 1), where
µ† is an unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1]) based on the observation
of n data point d1, . . . , dn up to resolution δ (i.e. we observe di ∈ Bδ(xi) with xi ∈ [0, 1]
for i = 1, . . . , n).
Our purpose is to examine the sensitivity of the Bayesian answer to this problem
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with respect to the choice of a particular prior. Consider the model class
A :=M([0, 1]), (1.3)
and the class of priors
Π :=
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = m} .
Observe that Π corresponds to the assumption that µ† is the realization of a random
measure on [0, 1] whose mean is on average m.
As in the previous example, the finite codimensional class of priors Π leads to brit-
tleness in the sense that the least upper bound on prior values is
U(Π) = m
a
, (1.4)
whereas, for δ  1/n, the least upper bound on posterior values (using Definition 1.1)
is the deterministic supremum of the quantity of interest (over A), i.e.
U(Π|Bnδ ) = 1. (1.5)
Furthermore, worst priors are obtained by selecting priors for which the probability of
observing the data µn[Bnδ ] is arbitrarily close to zero except when Φ(µ) is close to its
deterministic supremum. The bound on prior values (1.4) is obtained from theorems
3.6 and 3.11 in Examples 3.7 and 3.15. The bound on posterior values (1.5) is obtained
from theorems 4.8 and 4.13 in Examples 4.9 and 4.16.
Can this brittleness be avoided by adding a uniform constraint on the probability
of observing the data in the model class? To investigate this question let us introduce
α ≥ 1 and a probability measure µ0 on [0, 1] with strictly positive Lebesgue density
(with a prototypical example being that µ0 is itself uniform measure on [0, 1]), consider
the (new) model class
A(α) :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1αµn0 [Bnδ ] ≤ µn[Bnδ ] ≤ αµn0 [Bnδ ]
}
, (1.6)
and the (new) class of priors
Π(α) :=
{
pi ∈M(A(α)) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = m} . (1.7)
Note that, for the model classA(α), the probability of observing the data is uniformly
bounded below by 1αµ
n
0 [B
n
δ ] and above by αµ
n
0 [B
n
δ ]. Therefore, for α = 1, the probability
of observing the data is uniform in the model class, prior values are equal to posterior
values, and the method is robust but learning is impossible. If α slightly deviates from
1, then the calculus developed in this paper allows us to compute the least upper bound
on posterior values and obtain that
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 1
1 + 1
α2
a−m
m
=
m
a
α2
+m(1− 1
α2
)
. (1.8)
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We refer to Example 4.10 for the derivation of (1.8) from Theorem 4.8.
Note that the right hand side of (1.8) is equal to m/a for α = 1 (when the proba-
bility of the data is constant on the model class) and quickly converges towards 1 as α
increases. As a numerical application observe that for a = 34 and m =
a
2 =
3
8 , we have
limδ→0 U
(
Π(α)
)
= 12 and
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 1
1 + 1
α2
Therefore, for α = 2, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(2)|Bnδ ) = 0.8,
and for α = 10, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(10)|Bnδ ) ≈ 0.99.
Moreover, if α is derived by assuming the probability of each data point to be known
up to some tolerance γ, i.e. if the model class A(α) is replaced by
Aγ :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1γµ0[Bδ(xi)] ≤ µ[Bδ(xi)] ≤ γµ0[Bδ(xi)] for i = 1, . . . , n
}
(1.9)
for some γ > 1, then it can be shown that
lim
δ→0
U(Π|Bnδ ) =
1
1 + 1
γ2n
,
which exponentially converges towards 1 as the number n of data points goes to infinity.
In conclusion, the effects of a uniform constraint on the probability of the data
under finite information in the model class show that learning ability comes at the
price of loss in stability in the following sense: when α = 1, the data is equiprobable
under all measures in the model class, posterior values are equal to prior values, the
method is robust but learning is not possible. As α deviates from one, the learning
ability increases as robustness decreases, and when α is large, learning is possible but
the method is brittle.
1.5 Missing Stability Condition for Using Bayesian Inference Under
Finite Information
The previous examples have shown that Bayesian inference can be unstable under finite
information, therefore, at the very least, the question of the existence and of the nature
of a stability condition for using Bayesian inference remains to be answered. Indeed it
is well known that numerical solutions of PDEs can become unstable if specific stability
conditions such as the CFL stability condition are not satisfied. Although numerical
schemes that do not satisfy the CFL condition may look grossly inadequate, the existence
of such perverse examples does not imply the dismissal of the necessity of a stability
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condition. Similarly, although one may, as in Subsection 1.3, exhibit grossly perverse
worst priors, the existence of such priors does not invalidate the question of the missing
stability condition for using Bayesian inference under finite information.
The example provided in Subsection 1.4 suggests that, in the framework of Bayesian
sensitivity analysis, (i) such a stability condition would depend on how well the prob-
ability of the data is known or constrained in the model class, and (ii) learning and
robustness are antagonistic/conflicting requirements — there is no free lunch and in-
creased learning potential is paid for by decreased stability of posterior values.
Could this stability condition be derived from closeness in Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence? The problem with this approach is that closeness in Kullback–Leibler divergence
cannot be tested with discrete data and it requires the non-singularity of the data gener-
ating distribution with respect to the model, which could be a strong assumption for the
certification the safety of a critical system. Indeed, when performing Bayesian analysis
on function spaces, as is now increasingly popular, for studying PDE solutions, results
like the Feldman-Ha´jek theorem [45, 56] tell us that most pairs of measures are mutu-
ally singular, and hence at Kullback–Leibler distance infinity from one another. Another
problem with using Kullback–Leibler divergence is that a local sensitivity analysis (in
the sense of Fre´chet derivatives) of posterior values suggests infinite sensitivity as the
number of data point goes to infinity [54] (and this result is valid for the broader class
of divergences that includes the Hellinger distance).
A close inspection of some of the cases where Bayesian inference has been successful
shows the existence of a non-Bayesian feedback loop on the evaluation of its performance
[75, 77, 89]. Therefore one natural question is whether the missing stability condition
could be derived by exiting the strict framework of Bayesian analysis/inference. Accord-
ing to Efron [43], without genuine prior information
“Bayesian calculations cannot be uncritically accepted and should be checked
by other methods, which usually means frequentistically.”
1.6 Calculus for Measures over Measures
The results of this paper are derived from a calculus allowing us to solve/reduce opti-
mization problems with variables corresponding to measures over measures over arbitrary
Polish spaces. The following assertion of Theorem 3.11 is an example of this calculus.
sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
= sup
Q∈Q
[
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ)
]]
. (1.10)
In (1.10), Ψ is a measurable function mapping A (a Suslin subset of the set M(X ) of
probability measures on a Polish space X ) into a separable metrizable space Q, Q is a
subset ofM(Q), and Φ is a measurable quantity of interest defined onM(X ). Therefore,
(1.10) states that the optimization problem (in its left hand side) over Ψ−1Q (a subset
of the set of measures of A, i.e. a subset of the set of measures of the set of measures over
X ) is equal to the nesting of an optimization problem over Ψ−1(q) (a subset of A, i.e. a
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(a) Problem 3 (b) Problems 4 and 5
Figure 1.2: Reduction of optimization problems over measures and over measures over
measures.
subset of the set of measures over X ) and an optimization problem over Q (a subset of
the set of measures over Q).
We will now illustrate this calculus by showing how (1.4) can be derived through a
simple application of (1.10). First we need to give a short reminder on optimization over
measures via the following problem.
Problem 3. A child is given one pound of playdoh and the seesaw illustrated by Figure
1.2.(a). How much mass can she put above the threshold a while keeping the seesaw
balanced at m?
The mathematical formulation of the question articulated in Problem 3 is as follows.
What is the least upper bound on P[X ≥ a] if P is an unknown (imperfectly known)
probability measure on [0, 1] having mean m? The answer to this question is
sup
µ∈A
µ[a, 1] (1.11)
where A is the set of probability measures on [0, 1] having mean m. Although (1.11)
is an infinite dimensional optimization problem over measures, it is easy to see that to
achieve the maximum, any mass put above a should be placed exactly at a to create
minimum leverage towards the right hand side of the seesaw and any mass put below
a should be placed at 0 to create maximum leverage towards the left hand side of the
seesaw (as illustrated in Figure 1.2.(a)). This simple argument allows to reduce (1.11)
to a simple one dimensional problem whose solution is ma and corresponds to Markov’s
inequality. This simple example of reduction calculus has a generalization to spaces of
functions and measures [82] and is based on a form of linear programming in spaces
of measures. In particular, the calculus developed in [82] uses results of Winkler [107]
— which follow from an extension of Choquet theory (see e.g. [84]) by von Weizsa¨cker
and Winkler [97, Corollary 3] to sets of probability measures with generalized moment
constraints — and a result of Kendall [64] characterizing cones, which are lattice cones
in their own order.
We will now consider the next level of complexity, illustrated by the following two
equivalent problems.
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Problem 4. 10, 000 children are, each, given one pound of playdoh and a seesaw. On
average, how much mass can they put above the threshold a while, on average, keeping
the seesaws balanced at m?
Problem 5. A child is given one pound of playdoh and a seesaw. What can you say
about how much mass she is putting above the threshold a if all you have is the belief
that she is keeping the seesaw balanced at m?
The mathematical formulation of problems 4 and 5 is as follows (for Problem 4,
replace 10, 000 by N and consider the asymptotic limit N →∞). What is the least upper
bound on Eµ∼pi
[
µ[X ≥ a]] if pi is an unknown (imperfectly known) probability measure
onM([0, 1]) (the set of probability distributions on [0, 1]) such that Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = m?
The answer to this question is
sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
µ[X ≥ a]], (1.12)
where Π is the set of measures of probability pi on the set of measures of probability on
[0, 1] such that Eµ∼pi
[
Eµ[X]
]
= m.
Although (1.12) is an optimization over measures over measures, the calculus of
(1.10) introduced in Theorem 3.11 allows us to reduce it to the nesting of two optimiza-
tion problems over measures as follows.
sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = sup
Q∈M([0,1]) :EQ[q]=m
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈M([0,1]) :Eµ[X]=q
µ[X ≥ a]
]
. (1.13)
Observe that (1.13) is obtained from (1.10) by taking X = [0, 1], Ψ(µ) = Eµ[X],
Q = [0, 1] andQ as the set of measures of probability onQ having mean m. In particular,
note that in (1.13), the inner optimization problem involves taking a supremum over all
measures µ on [0, 1] having mean q and the outer optimization problem involves taking
a supremum over the probability distribution of q, i.e. the set of distributions on [0, 1]
having mean m. Solving the inner optimization problem as described below Problem 3
leads to:
sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = sup
Q∈M([0,1]) :EQ[q]=m
Eq∼Q
[
min(
q
a
, 1)
]
,
and solving the outer optimization step gives the following solution.
sup
pi∈Π
Eµ∼pi
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = m
a
.
1.7 Structure of the Paper and Main Results
This paper is structured as follows:
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Section 2 incorporates Bayesian priors into the Optimal Uncertainty Quantification
(OUQ) framework [82]. In the OUQ framework, Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) is for-
mulated as an optimization problem (over an infinite-dimensional set of functions and
measures) corresponding to extremizing (i.e. finding worst and best case scenarios) prob-
abilities of failure or other quantities of interest, subject to the constraints imposed by
the scenarios compatible with the assumptions and information. In this generalization,
priors are probability measures on spaces of measures, and computing optimal bounds
on prior values (given a set of priors) requires solving problems in which the optimization
variables are measures on spaces of measures (the results of this paper can be extended
to measures over spaces of measures and functions but, for the sake of simplicity and
clarity, we will limit the presentation to measures over measures).
Section 3 shows how such optimization problems can, under general conditions, be
reduced to the nesting of two optimization problems over measures, where then we can
apply the reduction theorems of [82].
Section 4 provides similar reduction theorems for the computation of optimal bounds
on posterior values given a set of priors and the observation of the data. These reduction
theorems lead to the brittleness results of Theorems 4.13, 6.4, and 6.9.
Section 5 reviews questions of Bayesian consistency, inconsistency, model misspeci-
fication, and robustness through a motivating analysis and interprets the results of this
paper in relation to those questions.
Section 6 presents the brittleness under local misspecification results of Theorems 6.4
and 6.9. That is, given a model, Theorem 6.4 provides optimal bounds on posterior values
for priors that are at arbitrarily small distance (in the Prokhorov or total variation
metrics) from a given model. Theorems 6.4 and 6.9 show that these optimal bounds
on posterior values are the essential supremum and infimum of the quantity of interest
irrespective of the size of data and of the size of the metric neighborhood around the
model. Finally, Sections 8 and 9 contain the proofs.
2 General Set-Up
2.1 Notation and Conventions
Throughout, for a topological space Y, B(Y) will denote the Borel σ-algebra of subsets
of Y and M(Y) will denote the space of Borel probability measures generally endowed
with the weak topology and the corresponding Borel σ-algebra unless specified otherwise.
For an alternative σ-algebra ΣY of subsets of Y the set of probability measures on the
σ-algebra ΣY will be denoted M(ΣY). For a mapping between topological spaces, the
term “measurable” will mean Borel measurable unless specified otherwise. Moreover,
suprema over the empty set will have the value −∞ and infima over the empty set the
value +∞.
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2.2 The General Problem and the Optimal Uncertainty Quantification
(OUQ) Framework
Let X be Polish and Φ be a measurable function mappingM(X ), the set of measures of
probability on X , onto the real line R, known as the quantity of interest. Let µ† be an
unknown or imperfectly known probability measure on X . The general problem guiding
our presentation will be that of estimating Φ(µ†).
Let A be an arbitrary subset of M(X ). If A represents all that is known about µ†
(in the sense that µ† ∈ A and that any µ ∈ A could, a priori, be µ† given the available
information) then [82] shows that the quantities
U(A) := sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ) (2.1)
L(A) := inf
µ∈A
Φ(µ) (2.2)
determine the inequality
L(A) ≤ Φ(µ†) ≤ U(A), (2.3)
to be optimal given the available information µ† ∈ A as follows: It is simple to see that
the inequality (2.3) follows from the assumption that µ† ∈ A. Moreover, for any ε > 0
there exists a µ ∈ A such that
U(A)− ε < Φ(µ) ≤ U(A).
Consequently since all that we know about µ† is that µ† ∈ A, it follows that the upper
bound Φ(µ†) ≤ U(A) is the best obtainable given that information, and the lower bound
is optimal in the same sense.
Although the OUQ optimization problems (2.1) and (2.2) are extremely large, we
have shown in [82], for the more general situation where A is a set of functions f and
measures µ and Φ a function of (f, µ), that an important subclass enjoys significant and
practical finite-dimensional reduction properties. First, by [82, Cor. 4.4], although the
optimization variables (f, µ) lie in a product space of functions and probability measures,
for OUQ problems governed by linear inequality constraints on generalized moments, the
search can be reduced to one over probability measures that are products of finite convex
combinations of Dirac masses with explicit upper bounds on the number of Dirac masses.
Furthermore, in the special case that all constraints are generalized moments of functions
of f , the dependency on the coordinate positions of the Dirac masses is eliminated by
observing that the search over admissible functions reduces to a search over functions on
an m-fold product of finite discrete spaces, and the search over m-fold products of finite
convex combinations of Dirac masses reduces to a search over the products of probability
measures on this m-fold product of finite discrete spaces [82, Thm. 4.7]. Finally, by [82,
Thm. 4.9], using the lattice structure of the space of functions, the search over these
functions can be reduced to a search over a finite set.
For the sake of clarity we will now restrict the presentations of our results to the
(simpler) situation where the quantity of interest Φ is (solely) a function of an unknown
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measure µ. As in [82], the results of this paper can be generalized to situations where Φ
is a function of (f, µ).
Example 2.1. A classic example, when X = R is Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] where a is a safety
margin. In the certification context one is interested in showing that µ†[X ≥ a] ≤ ε,
where ε is a safety certification threshold (i.e. the maximum acceptable µ†-probability
of the system exceeding the safety margin a). If U(A) ≤ ε, then the system associated
with µ† is safe even in the worst case scenario (given the information represented by A).
If L(A) > ε, then the system associated with µ† is unsafe even in the best case scenario
(given the information represented by A). If L(A) ≤ ε < U(A), then the safety of the
system cannot be decided (although we could declare the system to be unsafe due to
lack of information).
2.3 Bayesian Priors on the Admissible Set
In the OUQ setting, an assumption of the form µ† ∈ A was used to derive the optimal
inequality (2.3). This paper will consider the situation in which one has priors on the
admissible set A and also information in the form of sample data. One of our goals
is to analyse the robustness (or brittleness) of Bayesian inference by obtaining optimal
bounds on posterior values given local misspecifications. In that context A can be viewed
as a model class, and µ†, as the realization of a probability measure (the prior) on A.
In order to define priors on the space of admissible scenarios, A needs to be given the
structure of a measurable space; i.e. a suitable σ-algebra ΣA on A must be provided.
From now on, we will assume A to be a Borel subset of the Polish spaceM(X ), endowed
with the Borel σ-algebra for A. We will also refer to a probability measure pi ∈M(ΣA)
as a prior.
Remark 2.2. The desire to have the Borel measurable structure of a Polish space might
seem to be a spurious level of abstraction, but there are many good reasons for it. The
first is that, by Suslin’s Theorem [63, Thm. 14.2], all Borel subsets of a Polish space are
Suslin, where a Suslin space is a continuous Hausdorff image of a Polish space. Indeed,
Suslin sets are important in measurable selection theorems (see e.g. [29]) such as those
that we use in the proof of Lemma 3.10; furthermore, in addition to Ulam’s theorem [6,
Thm. 4.3.8] that all probability measures on a Polish space are regular (approximable
from within by compact sets), Schwartz’ theorem [87] implies that that all probability
measures on a Suslin space are regular, and, therefore, [95, Thm. 11.1] implies that the
extreme points in the space of probability measures on a Suslin space are the Dirac
measures. Consequently, when M(X ) is Polish, any Borel subset A ⊆ M(X ) is Suslin
and so the extreme points of probability measures on A are the Dirac measures, and
some powerful measurable selection theorems are available. Moreover, when the base
space is metrizable, then the space of probability measures is Polish in the weak topology
if and only if the base space is Polish.
Furthermore, since separability is equivalent to second countability for metric spaces,
we have that the Borel structure of a product is the product of Borel structures of
Polish spaces. In addition, by [40, Thm. 10.2.2], regular conditional probabilities exist
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for observables with values in a Polish space. Also, Polish spaces are the spaces of
Descriptive Set Theory, see e.g. Kechris [63]. Polish spaces appear to be the appropriate
spaces to play topological games such as the Banach–Mazur game [83], the Sierpin´ski
game, the Ulam game, the Banach game, and the Choquet game. Moreover, a theorem
of Choquet [63, Thm. 8.18] shows that a separable metric space is completely metrizable
(and hence Polish) if and only if the second player has a winning strategy in the strong
Choquet game. For a review of topological games, see Telga´rsky’s review [93], and for
topological games in hyperspace see that of Zsilinszky [108].
2.4 Data Spaces and Maps
In practice, the probability measure µ† is not observed directly; instead the sample data
arrives in the form of (realizations of) observation random variables, the distribution
of which is related to µ†. To simplify the current presentation, we will assume that
this relation is determined by a function of µ† — such as the case where the data
X1, . . . , Xn are determined by n independent realizations Xi of the random variable X
determined by the possibly unknown distribution µ†. Throughout this paper we will use
the following notation: D will denote the observable space (i.e. the space in which the
sample data take values); D will be assumed to be a metrizable Suslin space and D will
denote a D-valued random variable producing the observed sample data. To represent
the dependence of the observation random variable D on the unknown state µ† ∈ A we
introduce a measurable function
D : A →M(D),
where M(D) is given the Borel structure corresponding to the weak topology, to define
this relation. The idea is that D(µ) is the probability distribution of the observed sample
data D(µ) if µ† = µ, and for this reason it may be called the data map or — even more
loosely — the observation operator. Often, for simplicity, we will write D instead of
D(µ). Note that when the data comes in the form of n i.i.d. realizations of µ† we have
D = X n and D(µ) = µn (where µn is the n-fold tensorization of µ).
We proceed with a natural generalization of the Campbell measure and Palm distri-
bution associated with a random measure as described in [62] (see also [33, Ch. 13] for
a more current treatment). To that end, observe that since D is metrizable, it follows
from [4, Thm. 15.13], that, for any B ∈ B(D), the evaluation ν 7→ ν(B), ν ∈ M(D), is
measurable. Consequently, the measurability of D implies that the mapping
D̂ : A× B(D)→ R
defined by
D̂(µ,B) := D(µ)[B], for µ ∈ A, B ∈ B(D)
is a transition function in the sense that, for fixed µ ∈ A, D̂(µ, · ) is a probability measure,
and, for fixed B ∈ B(D), D̂( · , B) is Borel measurable. Therefore, by [23, Thm. 10.7.2],
any pi ∈M(A), defines a probability measure
pi  D ∈M(B(A)× B(D))
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through
pi  D[A×B] := Eµ∼pi[1A(µ)D(µ)[B]], for A ∈ B(A), B ∈ B(D), (2.4)
where 1A is the indicator function of the set A:
1A(µ) :=
{
1, if µ ∈ A,
0, if µ /∈ A.
It is easy to see that pi is the A-marginal of pi  D. Moreover, when X is Polish, [4,
Thm. 15.15] implies that M(X ) is Polish, and it follows that A ⊆ M(X ) is second
countable. Consequently, since D is Suslin and hence second countable, it follows from
[40, Prop. 4.1.7] that
B(A×D) = B(A)× B(D)
and hence pi  D is a probability measure on A×D. That is,
pi  D ∈M(A×D).
Let us refer to an element ofM(A) as a prior onA. With a prior pi onA, the quantity
of interest Φ(µ) becomes a random variable and we will be interested in estimating its
distribution conditioned on the observation D ∈ B, where B ∈ B(D).
Example 2.3. In the context of Example 2.1, we are interested in estimating the prob-
ability (under the prior pi) that the system is unsafe, conditioned on the observations
D ∈ B, i.e. the conditional expectation
(pi  D)
[
µ[X ≥ a] > 
∣∣∣D ∈ B].
If D corresponds to observing independent realizations of X, then the observation space
D is X n and the measure D(µ) is µn.
If D is the random variable that results from observing n independent realizations
of (X + ξ) (X is observed with additive Gaussian noise ξ ∼ N (0, σ2)), then the measure
D(µ) is the one associated with the random variable D =
(
X1 + ξ1, . . . , Xn+ ξn)
)
where
the Xi are independent and distributed according to µ and the ξi are independent
Gaussian random variables of mean zero and variance σ2.
2.5 Bayes’ Theorem and Conditional Expectation
Henceforth A will be a Suslin space, and suppose now that we have piD ∈M(A×D)
constructed in the above way. Let pi · D denote the corresponding Bayes’ sampling
distribution defined by the D-marginal of pi  D, and note that, by (2.4), we have
pi · D[B] := Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
, for B ∈ B(D). (2.5)
Since both D and A are Suslin it follows that the product A × D is Suslin. Con-
sequently, [23, Cor. 10.4.6] asserts that regular conditional probabilities exist for any
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sub-σ-algebra of B(A × D). In particular, the product theorem of [23, Thm. 10.4.11]
asserts that product regular conditional probabilities(
pi  D)|d ∈M(A), for d ∈ D
exist and that they are pi · D-a.e. unique.
When we consider pi ∈ M(A) a prior, then this result can be interpreted as the
posteriors of Bayes’ theorem. However, because such regular conditional probabilities are
only uniquely defined pi ·D-a.e., when a data sample d ∈ D arrives such that pi ·D[{d}] =
0, a posterior
(
pi  D)|d that could be any of the pi · D-a.e.-equal regular conditional
probabilities evaluated at d appears to have dubious utility. Indeed, the fact that the
regular conditional probabilities are only uniquely defined pi·D-a.e. suggests that integrals
of posteriors over subsets B ∈ B(D) such that pi ·D[B] > 0 are the more natural objects.
Moreover, the restriction that B be an open set is natural for practical reasons, since
conditioning on D lying in an open subset B rather than on its exact value is what one
has to do when the sample data can only be observed after rounding error. Furthermore,
we will show in Section 4 that if the data d have been sampled from a probability measure
pi† ·D for some pi† ∈M(A) (commonly called a “true prior” in Bayesian statistics) then
with pi† · D probability one (on the realization of d), the pi† · D-measure of any open
set containing d is strictly positive. In other words, pi† · D-almost surely, pi† (the “true
prior”) belongs to the random subset of M(A) defined as the priors pi ∈ M(A) such
that pi · D[B] > 0 for any open set B containing the data d (this subset is randomized
through the realization of the data d).
Finally, throughout, we will find it useful to assume that
Assumption 1. Φ is semibounded
in that it is either bounded above or bounded below. Semiboundedness is sufficient
to ensure that the integral of Φ with respect to any probability measure exists, possibly
with the value ∞ or −∞, and such integrands are sufficient for the reduction theorems
of Winkler [107] that we use.
Remark 2.4. Note that the assumption that Φ is semibounded is mostly for convenience
since integrands which are not semibounded, like that defining the first moment, can be
considered by restricting the space of measures to those measures that have well-defined
first moments.
2.6 Incompletely Specified Priors
In practical situations, (1) the choice of a particular prior on A involves a degree of
arbitrariness that may be incompatible with the certification of rare/critical events, and
(2) the definition of such a prior is a non-trivial task if A is infinite dimensional. For
these reasons it is necessary to consider situations in which the prior pi is imperfectly
known or specified. More precisely, the (lack of) information (or specification) on pi can
be represented via the introduction of a space Π where the subset Π ⊆ M(A) consists
of the set of admissible priors pi.
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One of our goals in allowing incompletely specified priors is to assess the robustness
of posterior Bayesian estimates with respect to the particular choice of priors. More
precisely we will compute optimal bounds on Epi[Φ] when pi ∈ Π and show how these
bounds are affected by the introduction of sample data by computing optimal bounds
on EpiD[Φ|B], for B ∈ B(D).
3 Optimal Bounds on the Prior Value
Recall that for a subset A and a measurable quantity of interest Φ: A → R, that under
the assumption µ† ∈ A, we have the optimal upper U(A) and lower L(A) bounds on the
value Φ(µ†) of the quantity of interest, defined in (2.1) and (2.2) by
U(A) := sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ)
L(A) := inf
µ∈A
Φ(µ) .
When we put a prior pi on A, we have to define the value Φ¯(pi) of the prior pi
corresponding to an extended quantity Φ¯ : M(A) → R of interest corresponding to Φ.
Disregarding integrability concerns, for a given Φ, let us call the induced function
Φ¯(pi) := Epi[Φ], pi ∈M(A), (3.1)
the canonical one associated with Φ and abuse notation by denoting the function Φ¯ as
Φ. For such a canonical quantity of interest, we call the value Epi[Φ] the prior value, and
note that the values
U(Π) := sup
pi∈Π
Epi
[
Φ
]
(3.2)
L(Π) := inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[
Φ
]
(3.3)
form a natural generalization of the values U(A) and L(A). Moreover, in the same way
that U(A) and L(A) are optimal upper and lower bounds on Φ(µ†) given the information
that (µ†) ∈ A, U(Π) and L(Π) are optimal upper and lower bounds on Epi
[
Φ
]
given the
information that pi ∈ Π. Of course, for these expressions to be well defined, integra-
bility concerns should be addressed. Indeed, Assumption 1 implies that Epi
[
Φ
]
is well
defined for any bounded measure pi, possibly with the value ∞ or −∞, and therefore
the quantities in (3.2) and (3.3) are well defined.
Remark 3.1. The restriction that the the extended quantity of interest corresponding
to Φ be canonical is really no restriction, but is assumed only to simplify the presentation
and notation. Indeed, there are many important extended quantities of interest that are
not affine as functions of the measure pi. However, all the ones that we have thought
of can be handled by small modifications of the present framework, and their inclusion
here would simply complicate the presentation and notation. Moreover, note that many
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affine non-canonical extended quantities of interest become canonical through simple
transformations. For example, when Φ1(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] is a quantity of interest, and
the extended quantity of interest is the probability that the system is unsafe, i.e. pi({µ |
µ[X ≥ a] > ε}) where {µ | µ[X ≥ a] > ε} is the set of unsafe µ, then this extended
quantity of interest is not canonical with respect to Φ1. However, by transformation to
Φ2 := 1{r|r>ε} ◦ Φ1, the extended quantity of interest becomes canonical and U(Π) and
L(Π), defined in terms of Φ2, are optimal upper and lower bounds on the probability
that the system is unsafe given the set of priors Π.
3.1 General Information Bounds on Prior Values
Let δ : A →M(A) be the mapping of points to unit Dirac measures, where δµ denotes
the Dirac mass at µ, and, for Π ⊆M(A), define
AΠ := δ−1Π = {µ ∈ A | δµ ∈ Π}. (3.4)
That is, AΠ consists of those scenarios µ that are not only admissible in the sense that
they lie in A, but are also admissible as a prior in the sense that δµ is an element of Π.
With the convention that U(∅) := −∞ and L(∅) := +∞, the following theorem
shows the relationships among U(A) and U(AΠ) as defined by (2.1), L(A) and L(AΠ)
as defined by (2.2), and U(Π) and L(Π) as defined by (3.2) and (3.3).
Theorem 3.2. It holds true that
U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π) ≤ U(A)
and
L(A) ≤ L(Π) ≤ L(AΠ).
Moreover, if AΠ is non-empty, then
L(A) ≤ L(Π) ≤ L(AΠ) ≤ U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π) ≤ U(A).
3.2 Priors Specified by Marginals
In many settings, probability measures or sets of probability measures are specified
through generalized moments or other properties of marginal distributions. To analyse
this case, let Q be a topological space and consider a measurable map Ψ: A → Q. Let us
abuse notation by also denoting the corresponding pushforward of measures Ψ: M(A)→
M(Q) by the same symbol Ψ. For a probability measure Q ∈M(Q), let
Ψ−1Q := {pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi = Q}
be the set of probability measures pi ∈ M(A) that push forward to Q. More generally,
for a non-empty set Q ⊆M(Q), let
Ψ−1Q := {pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi ∈ Q} (3.5)
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be the set of probability measures pi ∈ M(A) such that Ψpi ∈ Q. Now, let Q ⊆ M(Q)
be an admissible set of Ψ-marginals. Then the corresponding admissible set of priors
is Ψ−1Q ⊆ M(A) and the corresponding objects to be computed are U(Ψ−1Q) and
L(Ψ−1Q) according to (3.2) and (3.3).
We will now demonstrate how to reduce the computation of U(Ψ−1Q) and L(Ψ−1Q)
when Q is specified by linear inequalities. Later, in Section 3.2.2, we will develop a more
powerful nested reduction which will provide the foundation for our reduction methods.
Before we begin, we need to introduce some terminology. Following Winkler [107],
let Y be a topological space and let M ⊆ M(Y) be a convex set of measures. Let
ext(M) denote the set of extreme points of M and let the evaluation field Σ(ext(M))
be the smallest σ-algebra of subsets of ext(M) such that the evaluation map ν 7→ ν(B)
is measurable for all B ∈ B(Y). Then a measure ν ∈ M(Y) is said to be a barycenter
of M if there exists a probability measure p on Σ(ext(M)) such that the barycentric
formula
ν(B) =
∫
ext(M)
ν ′(B) dp(ν ′), B ∈ B(Y) (3.6)
holds. Furthermore, the following notion of a measure affine function is central to
Winkler’s [107] reduction theorems, which we use:
Definition 3.3. An extended real-valued function F on M ⊆ M(Y) is said to be
measure affine if, for all ν ∈M and all probability measures p on Σ(ext(M)) for which
the barycentric formula (3.6) holds, F is p-integrable and
F (ν) =
∫
ext(M)
F (ν ′) dp(ν ′).
A major consequence of Assumption 1, that Φ is semibounded, is that Eν [Φ] exists,
with possible values ∞ and −∞, for all finite measures ν. As a consequence, by [107,
Prop. 3.1], the extended-real-valued function ν 7→ Eν [Φ] is measure affine.
3.2.1 Primary Reduction for Prior Values
Let us consider the computation of
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Epi[Φ] (3.7)
when Q is specified by n generalized moment inequalities determined by measurable
functions g1, . . . , gn. The situation for the lower bound L(Ψ−1Q) is the same. That is,
let I1, . . . , In be n closed intervals, allowing semi-infinite intervals (−∞, qi] and [qi,∞),
and define
Q = {Q ∈M(Q) |EQ[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n} ,
where implicit in the definition is that all n integrals exist. Then, by a change of
variables, EΨpi[gi] = Epi[gi ◦Ψ] holds if either integral exists (see e.g. [10, Cor. 19.2]), so
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we conclude that
Ψ−1Q := {pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi ∈ Q}
= {pi ∈M(A) |EΨpi[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, , n}
= {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[gi ◦Ψ] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n} .
Hence, Ψ−1Q is defined by the n generalized moment inequalities corresponding to
gi ◦Ψ: A → R for i = 1, . . . , n. Consequently, since the function pi 7→ Epi[Φ] is measure
affine, it follows from the reduction theorems of [82] that we can reduce the supremum
on the right-hand side of (3.7) to the convex combination of n + 1 Dirac masses. To
state the theorem we have just proven, let
∆(n) :=
{
n∑
i=0
αiδµi
∣∣∣∣∣µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0, for i = 0, . . . , n
}
. (3.8)
be the set of non-negative combinations of n + 1 Dirac masses. Let the vector I of
intervals have components Ii for i = 1, . . . , n, let
Π(I) := Ψ−1Q
be defined as above, and consider the subset
Π(I, n) := Π(I) ∩∆(n) ⊆ Π(I) (3.9)
of those measures which are the (n+ 1)-fold convex combinations of Dirac masses.
Theorem 3.4. Let A be Suslin, let Q be separable and metrizable, and let Ψ: A → Q
be measurable. Moreover, for n measurable functions g1, . . . , gn : Q → R and n closed
intervals I1, . . . , In, let
Q := {Q ∈M(Q) |EQ[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n}
define the admissible set of Ψ-marginals. Then,
U(Π(I)) = U(Π(I, n))
where
U(Π(I, n)) =

sup
∑n
i=0 αiΦ(µi)
among µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=0 αi = 1
such that
∑n
i=0 αigj
(
Ψ(µi)
) ∈ Ij for j = 1, . . . , n. (3.10)
Remark 3.5. The freedom to determine intervals Ii, i = 1, . . . , n, is one way to in-
corporate uncertainty and maintain a reduction to n + 1 Dirac masses. In particular,
by choosing semi-infinite intervals Ii := (−∞, qi] we obtain a reduction to n + 1 Dirac
masses for inequality constraints of the form EQ[gi] ≤ qi, and by choosing point intervals
Ii := [qi, qi] we obtain a reduction to n + 1 Dirac masses for equality constraints of the
form EQ[gi] = qi. Moreover, by choosing the interval to be semi-infinite or point interval
depending on the index i we obtain a reduction to n+1 Dirac masses for mixed equality
and inequality constraints.
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Theorem 3.4 can be put into a canonical form in the following way: by considering
the modified feature map Ψ′ : A → Rn with components
Ψ′i := gi ◦Ψ, for i = 1, . . . , n,
it follows from the above that
Ψ−1Q =
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Epi[Ψ′] ∈ I} .
That is, by changing from the feature map Ψ to Ψ′ we end up with a constraint set defined
by the first moment of the vector function Ψ′. Therefore, let us remove the ′ from Ψ′,
and require Ψ: A → Rn to be measurable. The following theorem is the canonical form
of Theorem 3.4. It is a corollary of Theorem 3.4 for the constraint Epi[Ψ] ∈ Z when
Z = I is a closed rectangle. However, it is true for arbitrary Z ⊆ Rn.
Theorem 3.6. Let A be Suslin, let Ψ: A → Rn be measurable, let Z ⊂ Rn, and let
Q := {Q ∈M(Rn) |EQ∼Q[Q] ∈ Z} (3.11)
be the set of those measures whose first moment belongs to Z. Then, for
Π(Z) := Ψ−1Q = {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[Ψ] ∈ Z} (3.12)
and Π(Z, n) := Π(Z) ∩∆(n), we have
U(Π(Z)) = U(Π(Z, n))
where
U(Π(Z, n)) =

sup
∑n
i=0 αiΦ(µi)
among µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=0 αi = 1
such that
∑n
i=0 αiΨ(µi) ∈ Z.
(3.13)
Example 3.7. Let X := [0, 1], Q = R and consider the admissible set A :=M([0, 1]),
the quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] for some a ∈ (0, 1), and the map Ψ: A → R
defined by Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X]. Take as the set of admissible priors pi on A the collection
Π :=
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = q}
for some fixed q ∈ (0, a). Then we will show that
U(Π) = q/a. (3.14)
To that end, observe that since Eµ∼pi
[
Eµ[X]
]
= Epi[Ψ], it follows that
Π = {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[Ψ] = q} ,
so that Theorem 3.6 implies that we can reduce the optimization in U(Π) to the supre-
mum over µ1, µ2 ∈ A, α ∈ [0, 1] of
αµ1[X ≥ a] + (1− α)µ2[X ≥ a]
24
subject to the constraint
αEµ1 [X] + (1− α)Eµ2 [X] = q.
Introducing the slack variables q1 := Eµ1 [X], q2 := Eµ2 [X] and using [82, Thm. 4.1] to
reduce this problem further in µ1, µ2, we obtain that U(Π) is equal to the supremum
over α ∈ [0, 1] and q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] of
αmin{1, q1a }+ (1− α) min{1, q2a }
subject to the constraint αq1 + (1−α)q2 = q. Observing that the supremum is achieved
at q1, q2 ≤ a, we conclude that U(Π) = q/a, establishing (3.14). Moreover, note that
U(Π) = U(AΠ) for AΠ defined in (3.4) instead of the general inequality U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π)
of Theorem 3.2.
3.2.2 Nested Reduction for Prior Values
The result of Example 3.7 can also be deduced through a nested reduction that we
will find generally more useful for two reasons. The first is that, in practice, not only
is it highly non-trivial to specify a prior on the space A, since it requires quantifying
information on an infinite-dimensional space, but it may also be undesirable to do so.
Indeed, if an expert does not have a prior on the full space A but only on some projection
Ψ(A) = Q, then, rather than arbitrarily picking one particular prior on the space A
compatible with the specified prior on Ψ(A), it might be preferable to work with the
set of priors on A specified through such marginals. Our second and main motivation
is that, even when we can do the reduction on the primary space M(A), the reduced
space remains so large that it may not be amenable to computation. However with
the nested reduction theorems given below, the reduced space becomes computationally
manageable for finite-dimensional Q.
Example 3.8. Consider Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], where a is thought of as a safety margin,
Ψ(µ) = (Eµ[X],Varµ[X]), Q = R2, and Q = {Q}, where Q corresponds to the uniform
distribution on [−1, 1]× [3, 4]. In that example, the expert has only “the prior” that the
mean of X with respect to µ is uniformly distributed on [−1, 1] and that the variance
of X with respect to µ is independent of its mean and uniformly distributed on [3, 4].
Observe that in this situation Q does not uniquely specify a prior pi ∈ M(A) but an
infinite-dimensional set of priors Ψ−1(Q) ⊆M(A) and a robust approach would require
assessing the safety of the system under the whole set Ψ−1(Q) rather than under a
particular element pi of that set.
Idea of the Nested Reduction. Roughly, the idea of the nested reduction is as
follows. To compute (3.7), consider the induced function
U ◦Ψ−1 : Q → R
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defined by (U ◦Ψ−1)(q) := U(Ψ−1(q)) = sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ), for q ∈ Q,
where we use the notation of (2.1). From this it is natural to consider
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1], for Q ∈ Q.
Let Q ∈ Q. Then, for any pi such that Ψpi = Q, it follows that
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨpi[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Epi[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
Unfortunately, it is not true that U ◦ Ψ−1 ◦ Ψ = Φ; instead it is (U ◦ Ψ−1 ◦ Ψ)(µ) =
supµ′:Ψ(µ′)=Ψ(µ) Φ(µ
′). However, if it were true, then we would obtain
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨpi[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Epi[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
= Epi[Φ]
and conclude that
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Epi[Φ] = U(Ψ−1Q).
We will show that, despite the fact that U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ 6= Φ, the conclusion
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] (3.15)
is still valid, provided that it is interpreted correctly. Heuristically, the reason for this
is that the supremum suppi∈Ψ−1Q in U(Ψ−1Q) is exploring the maximum value of Φ on
level sets of Ψ very much like the supremum in
(U ◦Ψ−1)(q) = supΨ−1(q) Φ.
If A is such that a reduction theorem, e.g. from [82], applies to reduce the compu-
tation of the inner supremum in U ◦ Ψ−1 to the supremum over convex combinations
of Dirac masses, and the admissible set Q is such that a reduction theorem applies to
the computation of the outer supremum of supQ∈Q EQ[U ◦Ψ−1], then the identity (3.15)
represents a nesting of reductions.
Let us now establish a result like (3.15). To do so will require addressing three
questions: (1) What kind of function is U ◦Ψ−1? (2) What kind of measures Q ∈M(Q)
can define an integral of a function with properties discovered from the answer to (1)? (3)
Can we obtain a measurable solution operator to the optimization problem
(U ◦Ψ−1)(q),
where q ∈ Q? To that end, let us first recall a definition of universally measurable
functions.
Definition 3.9. Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, and for a positive measure ν on
(T, T ), let Tν denote the ν-completion of T . Let T̂ :=
⋂
ν Tν , where the intersection
is over all positive bounded measures ν, denote the universally measurable sets. A
T̂ -measurable function is said to be universally measurable.
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At the heart of the commutative representation used for the nested reduction is the
following optimal measurable selection lemma answering questions (1) and (3) above:
Lemma 3.10. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable space, and
let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Then, for any subset T ⊆ Ψ(A),
1. U ◦Ψ−1 is B̂(T )-measurable
2. for all δ > 0, there exists a δ-suboptimal B̂(T )-measurable section of Ψ; that is, a
B̂(T )-measurable function ψ : T → A such that Ψ(ψ(q)) = q for all q ∈ T and
Φ
(
ψ(q)
)
> U(Ψ−1(q))− δ, for all q ∈ T.
To answer question (2) above, define a support supp(Q) of a measure Q ∈M(Q), as
in [4, Ch. 12.3], to be a closed set such that
• Q(Q \ supp(Q)) = 0, and
• if G ⊆ Q is open and G ∩ supp(Q) 6= ∅, then Q(G ∩ supp(Q)) > 0.
When Q is a separable and metrizable space, it follows that it is second countable and
therefore, by [4, Thm. 12.14], all Q ∈ M(Q) have a uniquely defined support. Now
consider a measure Q ∈ M(Q) such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A). Then, by Lemma 3.10,
U ◦ Ψ−1 is B̂(supp Q)-measurable. Therefore, the expected value EQ[U ◦ Ψ−1] can be
defined by integration with respect to the completion Q̂:
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] := EQ̂[U ◦Ψ−1]. (3.16)
More generally, for any universally measurable function f and any finite measure Q, we
define the expected value EQ[f ] of f by
EQ[f ] := EQ̂[f ]. (3.17)
Such a method of defining integrals of, possibly non-Borel measurable, but universally
measurable, functions brings up many questions such as: when is it uniquely defined?;
for a fixed integrand, when is the expectation operation affine in the measure?; does it
have a change a variables formula? All such questions have nice answers and, although
we are sure that this is classical, we cannot find a reference for these facts so we have
included statements and proofs of the facts needed in this paper in Section 9.1 of the
Appendix.
We now state our nested reduction theorem of the form (3.15):
Theorem 3.11. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable space, and
let Ψ: A → Q measurable. Moreover, let Q ⊆ M(Q) be such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for
all Q ∈ Q. Then, for each Q ∈ Q, Ψ−1Q is non-empty. Moreover, the upper bound
U(Ψ−1Q), defined in (3.2), satisfies
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ
[U ◦Ψ−1]. (3.18)
where the expectations on the right-hand side are defined as in (3.16). Finally, the
expectation operator on the right-hand side is measure affine in Q.
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Remark 3.12. Note that (3.18) can be written
sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
= sup
Q∈Q
[
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ)
]]
. (3.19)
Remark 3.13. Since the right-hand side is measure affine in Q, if Q is specified through
(multi-)linear generalized moment inequalities, then the reduction theorems of [82] can
be applied to obtain the supremum over Q by reducing Q to a convex combination of
a finite number of Dirac masses on Q. Moreover, if Q consists of a single element,
i.e. Q = {Q}, then
U(Ψ−1Q) = U(Ψ−1Q) = EQ
[U ◦Ψ−1], (3.20)
and the right hand-side of (3.20) can be approximately evaluated via Monte Carlo sam-
pling of q ∈ Q according to the measure Q.
Remark 3.14. A similar theorem can obtained for the optimal lower bound L(Ψ−1Q).
Throughout this paper, results given for optimal upper bounds U can be translated into
results for optimal lower bounds L by considering the negative quantity of interest −Φ
and for the sake of concision we will not write those results unless necessary.
Example 3.15. Consider again Example 3.7, where X := [0, 1], Q = R, the admissible
set A := M([0, 1]), the quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] for some a ∈ (0, 1), the
map Ψ: A → R is defined by Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X], and the set of admissible priors pi on A is
the collection
Π := {pi ∈M(A) |Eµ∼pi [Eµ[X]] = q} .
for some fixed q ∈ (0, a). We will now demonstrate how the result U(Π) = q/a of (3.14)
obtained by the primary reduction follows from the nested reduction theorem. To that
end, observe that since Ψ(A) = [0, 1] ⊆ R, by restricting to measures Q ∈ M(R) with
support supp(Q) ⊆ [0, 1], Theorem 3.11 implies that
U(Π) = sup
Q∈Q
Eq′∼Q
[
sup
µ∈M([0,1]) :Eµ[X]=q′
µ[X ≥ a]
]
, (3.21)
where Q is the set of probability measures Q on R with support contained in [0, 1] such
that EQ[Q] = q. Theorem 4.1 of [82] shows that the inner supremum of µ[X ≥ a] can
be achieved by assuming that µ is the weighted sum of two Dirac masses, i.e.
sup
µ∈M([0,1])
Eµ[X]=q′
µ[X ≥ a] = sup
α,x1,x2∈[0,1]
αx1+(1−α)x2=q′
(αδx1 + (1− α)δx2)[X ≥ a]. (3.22)
For q′ > a, the supremum in the right-hand side of (3.22) is 1, and for q′ ≤ a, the
supremum in the right-hand side of (3.22) is achieved by x2 = 0, x1 = a and α = q
′/a,
and so we conclude that
sup
µ∈M([0,1])
Eµ[X]=q′
µ[X ≥ a] = min{1, q′a }.
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Hence, by identifying the measures Q ∈ M(R) with support supp(Q) ⊆ [0, 1] with
M([0, 1]) in the obvious way, (3.21) becomes
U(Π) = sup
Q∈M([0,1])
EQ[Q]=q
Eq′∼Q
[
min{1, q′a }
]
. (3.23)
Using [82, Thm. 4.1] again, we obtain that the supremum in Q in the right-hand side of
(3.23) is equal to the supremum over α, q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1], of
αmin{1, q1a }+ (1− α) min{1, q2a } (3.24)
subject to the constraint that αq1 +(1−α)q2 = q. This supremum is achieved by q1 = a,
q2 = 0 and α =
q
a , and so we obtain that U(Π) = q/a, in agreement with (3.14).
4 Optimal Bounds on the Posterior Value
What happens to the optimal bounds (3.2) and (3.3) on the prior value Epi[Φ], investi-
gated in Section 3, after conditioning on the data? Does the interval corresponding to
these optimal bounds shrink down to a single point as more and more data comes in?
Does this interval shrink as the measurement noise on the data is reduced? What hap-
pens to posterior estimates associated with two distinct but close priors, possibly sharing
the same marginal distribution on a high dimensional space? These are the questions
that will be investigated in this section. Our answers will show that: (1) optimal bounds
on posterior estimates grow as data comes in; (2) optimal bounds on posterior estimates
grow as measurement noise is reduced (3) two priors sharing the same high-dimensional
marginals can lead to diametrically opposed posterior estimates. In some sense these
results can be seen as extreme occurrences of the dilation property observed in robust
Bayesian inference [103].
As discussed in Section 2.4, let us now consider the case where the probability dis-
tribution of the data is a known function D(µ) of the admissible candidates µ ∈ A. As
shown in Section 2, directly conditioning measures pi  D with respect to the random
variable D representing the observed sample data would require manipulating regular
conditional probabilities on A×D.
Furthermore, in Bayesian statistics a prior pi may represent a “subjective belief”
about reality and, in such situations, the data may be sampled from pi† · D† which may
be distinct from pi · D. In frequentist analyses of Bayesian statistics pi† is called the
“true” prior, or “data-generating distribution”, and pi a “subjective” prior (see [14] and
references therein). Although it is known that the subjective prior pi might be distinct
from the true prior pi†, one may still try to evaluate the conditional expectation of the
quantity of interest Φ using pi as the distribution on A. We will show here that although
the observation of the sample data d does not uniquely determine the true prior pi†, it
does determine a random subset ofM(A) (i.e. a random subset of priors) denoted R(d)
such that, pi†-a.s., pi† ∈ R(d). This observation is based on the following fundamental
lemma:
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Lemma 4.1. For a strongly Lindelo¨f space Y and a Borel measure ν on B(Y), define
E :=
{
y ∈ Y
∣∣∣∣ there is an open neighborhood Oyof y such that ν(Oy) = 0
}
.
Then ν(E) = 0.
Remark 4.2. Recall that a Lindelo¨f space is a topological space such that any open
cover has a countable subcover and a strongly Lindelo¨f space is such that any open
subset is Lindelo¨f. Since D is assumed to be Suslin from Section 2.4, and Suslin implies
strongly Lindelo¨f, Lemma 4.1 shows that any open neighborhood Bd of any observed
value d ∈ D has nonzero measure with probability 1.
Remark 4.3. Any separable Hilbert space, in particular the Euclidian space Rk, is
strongly Lindelo¨f. In this situation, Lemma 4.1 implies that if for any observation y
generated by a law ν ∈M(Y) we place an open ball Br(y)(y) of non-zero radius r(y) > 0
about y, then with ν-probability 1 we have ν
(
Br(y)(y)
)
> 0. That is,
ν
({y ∈ Y | ν(Br(y)(y)) > 0}) = 1.
Now suppose the data d are generated according to a probability measure pi† · D
(where pi† is the “true” prior). We conclude from Lemma 4.1 that when we observe a
sample d, if we assume that pi† ∈ R(d) where
R(d) := {pi ∈M(A) ∣∣pi · D[B] > 0 for all B open containing d} ,
then we will be correct in this assumption with pi† ·D-probability 1. Therefore, when the
data d are generated and we observe that d ∈ Bd where Bd is an open subset containing
the data d (to keep our notation simple, we will, later on, drop d in the notation Bd),
then we restrict our attention to priors pi ∈ Π such that pi · D[Bd] > 0. That is to
say, we restrict our attention to the intersection of Π with the set of priors pi such that
pi ∈M(A) and pi · D[Bd] > 0. We write ΠBd for this intersection, i.e.
ΠBd := {pi ∈ Π |pi · D[Bd] > 0} .
If ΠBd is void, then we assert that “pi
† is not contained in Π” and we know that this
assertion is true with pi† ·D-probability 1 on the realization of the data d. Conversely, if
pi† is contained in Π, then ΠBd must, with pi
† · D-probability 1 on the realization of the
data d, still contain pi† (in particular it must be non-empty).
Happily, this approach also facilitates the efficient computation of the conditional
expectations because now they have a simple representation. Indeed, consider the condi-
tional expectation of an object of interest Φ given a prior pi and data map D, conditioned
on a subset B ∈ B(D) such that pi · D[B] > 0. It follows from (2.4) and (2.5) that the
conditional expectation of Φ given B is
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] := E(µ,d)∼piD[Φ(µ)1B(d)]
pi · D[B] ,
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which, using (2.4) and (2.5), leads to
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (4.1)
Moreover, recall that this conditional expectation is the best mean squared approxima-
tion of Φ under the measure pi  D, given the information that D ∈ B, i.e.
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = arg min
m∈R
EpiD
[(
Φ−m)2∣∣∣B]. (4.2)
Consequently, for any open subset B ⊆ D, we define
ΠB := {pi ∈ Π | (pi · D)[B] > 0} . (4.3)
where, by (2.5),
pi · D[B] := Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
. (4.4)
Then, since (pi · D)[B] > 0, the formula (4.1) for conditional expectation implies that
U(Π|B) := sup
pi∈ΠB
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] (4.5)
L(Π|B) := inf
pi∈ΠB
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] (4.6)
where
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (4.7)
Finally, if B is an open neighborhood containing the sample data d, then it follows
that U(Π|B) and L(Π|B) are optimal upper and lower bounds on the posterior values
EpiD[Φ|B], given the observation D ∈ B, over all pi ∈ Π such that pi · D[B] > 0.
Example 4.4. When Φ is the indicator function of the set {µ | µ[X ≥ a] > } (i.e.
the set of unsafe µ), U(Π|B) and L(Π|B) are optimal upper and lower bounds on the
“posterior probability” that the system is unsafe given the observation D ∈ B (and the
set Π of priors and observation maps respectively).
4.1 General Information Bounds on Posterior Values
Now let B ⊆ D be open and let
AΠB := {µ ∈ A | δµ ∈ Π and D(µ)[B] > 0} , (4.8)
U(AΠB ) := sup
µ∈AΠB
Φ(µ) ,
and use L for the corresponding infimum. The following theorem is a straightforward
consequence of (4.1):
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Theorem 4.5. It holds true that
U(AΠB ) ≤ U(ΠB) ≤ U(A),
and
L(A) ≤ L(ΠB) ≤ L(AΠB ).
Moreover, if AΠB is non empty, then
L(A) ≤ L(ΠB) ≤ L(AΠB ) ≤ U(AΠB ) ≤ U(ΠB) ≤ U(A).
Remark 4.6. The dependence of U(AΠB ) and L(AΠB ) on the sample data is very weak.
In particular, if D corresponds to observing i.i.d. realizations of (X+ξ, f †(X)+ξ′) where
ξ and ξ′ are centered Gaussian random variables of arbitrarily small (non zero) variance,
then it can be shown that U(AΠB ) = U(AΠ) and L(AΠB ) = L(AΠ). In that situation,
if L(AΠ) < U(AΠ), then U(AΠB )−L(AΠB ) remains bounded away from 0 by a strictly
positive constant that is independent of D and B, which, in particular, implies that the
range of achievable posterior values cannot shrink towards Φ(µ†) regardless of the number
of observed i.i.d. samples. The presence of such information bounds suggests that the
consistency of Bayesian estimators cannot be established independently of (uniformly
in) the choice of priors (this point will also be substantiated by Theorem 4.13).
4.2 Primary Reduction for Posterior Values
As in Section 3.2.1, when priors are specified through finite-dimensional inequalities, it is
possible to provide a reduction of the computation of U(Π|B) on the primary space. To
that end, letM+(A) denote the set of positive bounded measures on A and let us extend
the “expectation notation” to mean integration with respect to a positive measure in
the natural way: for a measurable function ψ and a pi+ ∈M+(A) define
Epi+ [ψ] :=
∫
A
ψ dpi+
if the integral exists.
Let ψ0, . . . , ψn be real-valued measurable functions on A and define
Π+ :=
{
pi+ ∈M+(A)
∣∣Epi+ [ψ0] = 1, and Epi+ [ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n} ,
where implicit in the definition is that all n+ 1 integrals exist, and let
Π+,n := Π+ ∩∆(n)
be the set of those measures in Π+ that are non-negative sums of n + 1 Dirac masses.
The following theorem is a generalization of [82, Thm. 4.1] to positive measures (see also
[107, Thm. 3.2] from which the proof of [82, Thm. 4.1] was derived).
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Theorem 4.7. If A is a Suslin space, then
sup
pi+∈Π+
Epi+ [Φ] = sup
pi+∈Π+,n+1
Epi+ [Φ]. (4.9)
Furthermore, if ψ0 is non-negative on A and there exists a measurable function ϕ such
that Φ = ψ0ϕ, then
sup
pi+∈Π+
Epi+ [Φ] = sup
pi+∈Π+,n
Epi+ [Φ]. (4.10)
Theorem 4.7 can be used to produce a primary reduction of U(Π B D) when Π is
defined by a finite number of equalities. To state the theorem, recall that, for arbitrary
Π and B, the definition
ΠB := {pi ∈ Π |pi · D[B] > 0}
of (4.3), where by (4.4)
pi · D[B] := Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
;
recall also the notation of (4.5)
U(Π|B) := sup
pi∈ΠB
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B];
and recall the result (4.1) that, for any pi ∈ ΠB,
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] .
The proof of the following theorem is obtained by first proving the theorem for equality
constraints Z = {q}, by observing that U(Π(q)∣∣B) is a linear fractional optimization
problem in pi and utilizing the fact that such problems are equivalent to linear problems
[27], and then applying Theorem 4.7. To extend the result to the subset Z ⊆ Rn, one
uses a layercake approach as in the proof of Theorem 3.6. As in Section 3, the following
primary reduction theorem, Theorem 4.8, will be formulated in canonical form and the
nested reduction theorem, Theorem 4.11, will be in the general form.
Theorem 4.8. Let A be Suslin and let Ψ: A → Rn be measurable. For Z ⊆ Rn, let
Π(Z) := {pi ∈ M(A) | Epi[Ψ] ∈ Z}. Then U
(
Π(Z)
∣∣B) is equal to the supremum over
αi ≥ 0, q ∈ Z and µi ∈ A of
n∑
i=0
αiΦ(µi)D(µi)[B]
subject to the constraints
n∑
i=0
αi
(
Ψ(µi)− q
)
= 0
and
n∑
i=0
αiD(µi)[B] = 1. (4.11)
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Example 4.9. Consider again Example 3.7 with the admissible set A :=M([0, 1]), the
quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], the map Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X] and the set of admissible
priors
Π :=
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = q} .
for some q ∈ (0, a). We saw in Example 3.7 that U(Π) = qa . Now suppose that we
observe the random variable D := (X1, . . . , Xn) corresponding to n i.i.d. samples of
µ† ∈ A. More precisely, we observe D ∈ B where B = B1 × · · ·Bn and Bi is the ball in
(0, 1) of center xi and radius ρ, xi ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < ρ  1/n. Let Dn denote the data
map corresponding to taking n i.i.d. samples, that is, Dn(µ) := µ⊗ · · · ⊗ µ, and observe
that Dn(µ)[B] =
∏n
i=1 µ[Bi].
Theorem 4.8 implies that U(Π B Dn) is equal to the supremum over α1, α2 ≥ 0,
µ1, µ2 ∈ A of
α1µ1[X ≥ a]Dn(µ1)[B] + α2µ2[X ≥ a]Dn(µ2)[B]
subject to the constraints
α1(Eµ1 [X]− q) + α2(Eµ2 [X]− q) = 0,
α1Dn(µ1)[B] + α2Dn(µ2)[B] = 1,
with Dn(µ)[B] =
∏n
i=1 µ(Bi). Introducing slack variables β1,i := µ1[Bi] and β2,i :=
µ2[Bi] as n linear constraints on µ1 and n linear constraints on µ2 we obtain (from
[82, Thm. 4.1]) that the supremum can be achieved by assuming that each µi is the
weighted sum of at most n+ 2 Dirac masses. Assuming that the Bi are non intersecting
balls of radius ρ  1/n centered on x1, . . . , xn, n of these Dirac masses will have to be
put at x1, . . . , xn; for optimality, the two others will have to be put at 0 and a (with
weights p1 and p2). Introducing γ1 = α1Dn(µ1)[B] and γ2 = α2Dn(µ2)[B], it follows
that U(ΠB Dn) is equal (as ρ ↓ 0) to the supremum over γ1, γ2 ≥ 0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] of
γ1p1 + γ2p2
subject to the constraints
γ1 + γ2 = 1,
and
γ1
(ap1 +
∑n
i=1 xiβ1,i)− q∏n
i=1 β1,i
+ γ2
(ap2 +
∑n
i=1 xiβ2,i)− q∏n
i=1 β2,i
= 0.
By considering 0 < βi,j  1 it is easy to obtain that U(ΠB Dn) = 1.
Example 4.10. We will now use Theorem 4.8 to prove equation (1.8) of Subsection 1.4.
Let Φ be defined as in Subsection 1.4. Let A(α) and Π(α) be defined as in (1.6) and
(1.7). Then, Theorem 4.8 implies that U(Π(α)|Bnδ ), the least upper bound on posterior
values, is equal to the supremum over α1, α2 ≥ 0, µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
α1µ1[X ≥ a]µn1 [Bnδ ] + α2µ2[X ≥ a]µn2 [Bnδ ]
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subject to the constraints{
α1(Eµ1 [X]−m) + α2(Eµ2 [X]−m) = 0,
α1µ
n
1 [B
n
δ ] + α2µ
n
2 [B
n
δ ] = 1,
where we have used the notation µn[Bnδ ] :=
∏n
i=1 µ(Bδ(xi)).
Introducing γ1 = α1µ
n
1 [B
n
δ ] and γ2 = α2µ
n
2 [B
n
δ ], it follows that U
(
Π(α)|Bnδ
)
is equal
to the supremum over γ1, γ2 ≥ 0, µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
γ1µ1[X ≥ a] + γ2µ2[X ≥ a]
subject to the constraints {
γ1 + γ2 = 1,
γ1
Eµ1 [X]−m
µn1 [B
n
δ ]
+ γ2
Eµ2 [X]−m
µn2 [B
n
δ ]
= 0.
which can be simplified to the supremum over µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
1
1 +
Eµ1 [X]−m
m−Eµ2 [X]
µn2 [B
n
δ ]
µn1 [B
n
δ ]
µ1[X ≥ a] + (1− 1
1 +
Eµ1 [X]−m
m−Eµ2 [X]
µn2 [B
n
δ ]
µn1 [B
n
δ ]
)µ2[X ≥ a] (4.12)
By introducing slack variables for m1 = Eµ1 [X] and m2 = Eµ2 [X], maximizing (4.12)
with m1 and m2, then taking a supremum over m1,m2, one obtains that the supremum
of (4.12) is achieved, in the limit δ ↓ 0, in the configuration where µ1 puts most of its
mass on a, µ2 puts most of its mass on 0, and
µn2 [B
n
δ ]
µn1 [B
n
δ ]
≈ 1
α2
which yields
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 1
1 + 1
α2
a−m
m
. (4.13)
4.3 Nested Reduction for Posterior Values
Here, as in Section 3.2, we show how the optimization problems (4.5) and (4.6) can
be reduced to nested OUQ optimization problems (i.e. nested problems analogous to
(2.1) and (2.2)) when the collection Π of admissible priors is defined by how they push
forward by a measurable mapping Ψ: A → Q. That is, we specify a feature space Q, a
measurable map Ψ: A → Q, a subset Q ⊆M(Q) and define the admissible set of priors
by
Π := Ψ−1Q = {pi ∈M(A) | Ψpi ∈ Q}.
As before, we focus on reducing the upper bound
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) := sup
pi∈(Ψ−1Q)B
EpiD[Φ|B]. (4.14)
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Theorem 4.11. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable space, and
let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Moreover, let Q ⊆ M(Q) be such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A)
for all Q ∈ Q. Then, for each Q ∈ Q, Ψ−1Q is non-empty. Moreover, the upper bound
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B), defined in (4.14), satisfies
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = sup{λ ∈ R ∣∣∣∣∣ supQ∈QEq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] > 0} , (4.15)
where the expectations on the right-hand side are defined as in (3.17). Finally, the
expectation operator on the right-hand side is measure affine in Q, as defined in (3.3).
Remark 4.12. Note that Theorem 4.11 is more general than Theorem 4.8 because
its application does not require the assumption that Ψ−1Q is defined via generalized
moments constraints.
The following theorem is our main result. It shows not only that the right-hand side
of the assertion (4.15) of Theorem 4.11 depends on the sample data in a very weak way,
but also that, under very mild assumptions, the observation of this sample data leads to
an increase (rather than a decrease) of the least upper bound on the quantity of interest:
Theorem 4.13 (Main Brittleness Theorem). Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a sepa-
rable and metrizable space, and let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Moreover, let Q ⊆M(Q)
be such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Suppose that, for all δ > 0, there exists
some Q ∈ Q such that
Eq∼Q
[
inf
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
D(µ)[B]
]
= 0 (4.16)
and
Pq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q),D(µ)[B]>0
Φ(µ) > sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ)− δ
]
> 0. (4.17)
Then
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = U(A). (4.18)
Remark 4.14. Note that the convention that sup∅ = −∞ implies that, if the assump-
tion (4.17) is satisfied, then there is a measure Q ∈ Q such that the set of q such that
D(µ)[B] > 0 for some µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) has strictly positive Q-measure.
Remark 4.15. Theorem 4.13 states that if there exists Q ∈ Q putting some mass on a
neighborhood of the values q of Ψ where supµ∈Ψ−1(q) Φ(µ) achieves its supremum, then
U(Ψ−1(Q)∣∣B) = U(A).
On the other hand, Theorem 3.2 asserts that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≤ U(A), (4.19)
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so we conclude that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≤ U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B). (4.20)
That is, observing the sample data does not improve the optimal bound! Moreover, when
the inequality (4.19) is strict, if we define
δ := U(A)− U(Ψ−1Q) > 0
then it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) + δ ≤ U(Ψ−1(Q)∣∣B), (4.21)
from which we conclude that when the inequality (4.19) is strict, observing the sample
data makes the optimal bound worse! In other words, after the observation of the sample
data (which may be limited to a single realization of X under the measure µ†, or an
arbitrary large number of independent samples of Xi) the optimal upper bound on the
quantity of interest,
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)
]
,
increases to
U(A) = sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ).
Example 4.16. Consider A := M([0, 1]), Φ(µ) = Eµ[X], Dn(µ) := µ ⊗ · · · ⊗ µ. In
this example are interested in estimating the mean of X under some unknown measure
µ† ∈ A and we observe d = (d1, . . . , dn), n i.i.d. samples from X; note that n can
be very large. The sample data contain information on µ† through the fact that their
distribution is Dn(µ†) = µ† ⊗ · · · ⊗ µ† (i.e. although the distribution of the sample data
is unknown, its dependency structure, as a functional of µ†, is known).
Let k be a (possibly large) number. Define Π to be the set of priors pi under which
the distribution of (Eµ[X], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]) is Q, where Q is a distribution on Rk such that
Eµ[X] (its first marginal) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and such that the (conditional)
distribution of Eµ[X2] conditioned on Eµ[X] = q1 is the uniform distribution on the
interval [
inf
µ∈A,E[X]=q1
Eµ[X2], sup
µ∈A,E[X]=q1
Eµ[X2]
]
and such that the conditional distributions of the other marginals Eµ[Xk] are defined
iteratively in the same manner. For this example, note that Ψ(µ) = (Eµ[X], . . . ,Eµ[Xk]).
Note that, for q := (q1, . . . , q
k) in the range of Ψ (i.e. Ψ(A)), Ψ−1(q) is the subset of
measures µ ∈ M([0, 1]) such that Eµ[Xi] = qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let B be defined as
B1 × · · ·Bn where each Bi is a ball of radius ρ containing di.
We will now use Theorem 4.13 to compute optimal bounds on the posterior values
of Φ(µ) = Eµ[X]. We will focus our attention on the upper bound. First observe that in
this example Q is reduced to the single measure Q constructed above and D is reduced
to the single data map Dn.
Let us first check that condition (4.17) is always satisfied (irrespective of the value
of the data d). Note that condition (4.17) is satisfied if for all δ > 0 there exists a
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subset of values of q of strictly positive Q-measure such that
{
µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) | Dn(µ)[B] >
0 and Eµ[X] ≥ 1 − δ
}
is non empty. So, let δ > 0 be arbitrary and define µd to be the
empirical distribution of d, i.e.
µd :=
∑n
i=1 δdi
n
.
Define
Aδ := {µ ∈ A | Eµ[X] ≥ 1− δ/2}.
One can show by induction that Ψ(Aδ) has a non-empty interior and that any open
subset of Ψ(A) has strictly positive Q-measure. Let q∗ be a point in the interior of
Ψ(Aδ), and let Bτ (q∗) be a ball of center q∗ and radius τ such that B2τ (q∗) is contained
in the interior of Ψ(Aδ). Note that Bτ (q∗) has strictly positive Q-measure. Furthermore,
for  sufficiently small, for each q ∈ Bτ (q∗) there exists q′ ∈ B2τ (q∗) and µ ∈ Ψ−1(q′)
such that µ := (1 − )µ + µd ∈ Ψ−1(q). Since Dn(µ)[B] > 0 and Eµ[X] ≥ 1 − δ/2, it
follows that (4.17) is satisfied (irrespective of the value of the data d).
Let us now consider condition (4.16). Observe that condition (4.16) is satisfied if for
Q-almost all q ∈ Ψ(A) and all  > 0, there exists µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) such that Dn(µ)[B] < .
Assume that d contains at least k + 2 distinct points and that ρ is strictly smaller than
half of the minimal distance between two of such points, so that the associated Bi do
not overlap; note that this assumption is satisfied with probability converging to one (as
n → ∞) if the data are sampled from a measure µ† that is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Let q ∈ Ψ(A); by the reduction theorems of
[82] there exists µq ∈ Ψ−1(q) such that µq is the weighted sum of at most k + 1 Dirac
masses in [0, 1]. Since there exist at least k+2 non-overlapping Bi we have Dn(µq)[B] = 0
which implies condition (4.16). Hence, Theorem 4.13 implies that, for this (possibly)
highly constrained problem characterized by a (possibly) large number of sampled data
points, the optimal bounds on the posterior values of Eµ[X] are zero and one whereas
the set of prior values of Eµ[X] is the single point {12}.
Remark 4.17. For a thorough analysis of Example 4.16 we refer to [80] where, in par-
ticular, a quantitative version of Theorem 4.13 is developed and then applied to Example
4.16. Curiously, a refined analysis of the integral geometry of the truncated Hausdorff
moment space, used to demonstrate the approximate satisfaction of the conditions of
Theorem 4.13, is shown in [80] to lead to a new family of Selberg integral formulas. See
[46] for a discussion of their importance.
Remark 4.18. Note that the assumptions of Theorem 4.13 are extremely weak. In
plain words, Theorem 4.13 implies that if the probability of observing the data can be
arbitrary small under priors contained in A that are putting mass near the extreme
values of Φ, then the optimal bounds on posterior values are the extreme values of Φ
in A (even if the data comes in the form of a large number of samples and the set of
priors is highly constrained). Example 4.16 illustrates that one consequence of Theorem
4.13 is that Bayesian posteriors are not robust, and in fact are fragile with respect to
the choices of priors constrained by marginals, even with a highly constrained subset of
priors of M(A).
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Moreover, if Π is convex, then by considering priors of the form pi0λ+ (1−λ)pi1 with
pi0, pi1 ∈ Π, pi0 ·D[B] > 0 and pi1 ·D[B] > 0, it is easy to see that the Bayesian posterior can
take any value in the interval
(L(A),U(A)), irrespective of the data. In addition, it is
easy to observe that even including the quantity of interest Φ in the marginal Ψ does not
prevent this fragility. Theorem 4.13 also leads to the following apparent paradoxes when
the Bayesian framework is applied to the space A: (1) Posteriors with different priors
may diverge as more and more data comes in; (2) When the sample data is observed
with some (say Gaussian) measurement noise of variance σ2, then, the optimal bound
U(Ψ−1(Q)∣∣B) on the quantity of interest Φ converges towards U(Ψ−1(Q)) as σ2 →∞.
That is, if one interprets optimal bounds on posterior values as uncertainty bounds,
then one would reach the paradoxical conclusion that adding measurement uncertainty
decreases the uncertainty of the quantity of interest. The idea of the proof of this
assertion is based on the following observation:
Let y be the (noisy) measurement whose distribution given the value of the data d
is assumed to be independent of µ. Write pσ(d)[B] for the probability that the value of
y belongs to a set B and observe that the conditional value of the quantity of interest
Φ given the y ∈ B is equal to
Epi
[
Φ(µ)Ed∼D(µ)
[
pσ(d)[B]
]]
Epi
[
Ed∼D(µ)
[
pσ(d)[B]
]] . (4.22)
We deduce that if pσ(d)[B]/pσ(d
′)[B] converges towards one as the level of noise σ →∞
uniformly in (d, d′) ∈ [0, 1]2 (which is the case if the data in Example 4.9 is observed
with Gaussian noise of increasing variance, see also Example 4.19 below), then (4.22)
converges towards the prior value of Φ as σ →∞ uniformly in pi.
The fact that optimal bounds on prior values may become less precise after condi-
tioning is known as the dilation phenomenon in robust Bayesian inference [103], and, in
some sense, the brittleness results presented in this paper could be seen as an extreme
occurrence of this phenomenon.
Example 4.19. Consider again Example 4.9 with the set of admissible priors pi on A
defined as the collection
Π :=
{
pi ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼pi[Eµ[X]] = q} .
and the map Dn corresponding to the observation of n i.i.d. samples of µ. For q ∈ (0, a),
let Q be the set of probability measures Q on [0, 1] such that Eq′∼Q[q′] = q. Let Q be
the probability measure on [0, 1] with probability density function p(x) = (1 − q)/q on
[0, q] and p(x) = q/(1− q) on (q, 1]. It is easy to check that Q ∈ Q, that
Eq′∼Q
[
inf
µ∈A :Eµ[X]=q′
n∏
i=1
µ[Bi]
]
= 0, (4.23)
and that, for all δ > 0,
Pq′∼Q
[
sup
µ∈A :Eµ[X]=q′,
∏n
i=1 µ[Bi]>0
Eµ[X] > 1− δ
]
> 0. (4.24)
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It follows from Theorem 4.13 that
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = 1. (4.25)
5 Bayesian Robustness and Consistency
It is appropriate at this point to place the results of Sections 3 and 4 in the more well-
established context of two key questions about Bayesian inference, namely its robustness
with respect to perturbations of the prior (and likelihood and observed data), and its
frequentist consistency. This discussion will also motivate Section 6, where we show
that Bayesian inference can be profoundly non-robust even under arbitrarily small local
perturbations in total variation and Prokhorov metrics.
5.1 Bayesian Robustness
The robust Bayesian viewpoint appears to have been introduced independently by Box
[25] and Huber [58]; see e.g. [15, 16] and Chapter 15 of [60] for surveys of the field. In
the robust Bayesian approach, a class Π of priors and a class Λ of likelihoods together
produce a class of posteriors by pairwise combination through Bayes’ rule. Robust
Bayesian methods are a subclass of the methods of imprecise probability ; the idea that
the probability of an event need not be a single real number has a history stretching
back to Boole [24] and Keynes [65], with more recent and comprehensive foundations
laid out in e.g. [68, 100, 105].
One way of generating such a class Π of priors is via a belief function, as in [104] and
Dempster–Shafer theory more generally. The belief function framework encompasses
prior probabilities whose values are known only on some finite partition of the proba-
bility space, and not the whole σ-algebra; classes of ε-contaminated priors can also be
represented in this way, as well as classes of locally perturbed priors. The belief function
approach has the useful feature that explicit formulae can be given for the lower and
upper posterior probabilities of events [104, Theorem 4.1].
Another typical approach to generating a class Π might be to consider a finite-
dimensional parametrized class of models. For example, one could consider, instead
of a single Gaussian prior on R of specified mean and variance, a two-parameter class
of Gaussian priors with a range of means and variances, or a three-parameter class
of skew-Gaussian priors. Similarly, one might consider a two-parameter class of beta
distributions instead of a uniform prior on a bounded interval.
However, a danger in specifying a finite-dimensional class Π of priors is that one is
making very strong statements about the form of the priors, particularly with regard to
the tails, that cannot be justified based on often-limited amounts of prior information.
For example, if all the priors pi ∈ Π have thin tails, then the class Π will have a very dif-
ficult time modeling events that lie in those tails, even when exposed to data from those
regions. This problem is particularly important in applied fields such as catastrophe
modeling, insurance, and re-insurance, in which the catastrophic events of interest are
by definition high-impact low-probability “Black Swan” events: the difference between
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an exponentially small and an inverse-polynomially small tail can be vitally important.
Also, because members of a finite-dimensional parametric family Π of priors often have
similar qualitative properties (such as being mutually absolutely continuous), the ap-
parently broader perspective does not not add much to the asymptotic posterior picture
in terms of robust consistency, although it does provide a broader understanding given
finitely many samples.
Rather than specifying a finite-dimensional Π, it is epistemologically more reason-
able to specify a finite-codimensional Π, for example by specifying interval bounds on the
expected values of finitely many observed test functions (i.e. generalized moment inequal-
ities); this setting encompasses the finite-partition belief function framework mentioned
above. Calculation of optimal prior and posterior bounds on quantities of interest is often
an exercise in numerical optimization [20, 82, 90] rather than closed-form formulae.
One consequence of Theorems 4.8 and 4.13 is that the very same Bayesian sensitivity
analysis framework that produces the robustness results of classical robust Bayesian
inference under finite-dimensional classes of priors also leads to brittleness results under
finite-codimensional classes of priors, when the set of all priors is infinite dimensional. As
illustrated by (1.8) and Example 4.10, Theorems 4.8 and 4.13 can also be used to obtain
robustness/stability results by adding sufficiently strong constraints (at the expense of
learning) on the probability of the data in the model class. As discussed in Subsection 1.4,
Example 4.10 suggests that posterior stability and learning are antagonistic properties
in Bayesian inference under finite information.
5.2 Motivation for Bayesian Inconsistency and Model Misspecification
To motivate Section 6 and interpret the results of this paper in relation to the issue of
convergence of posterior values in Bayesian inference we will now analyse and review
questions of Bayesian consistency, inconsistency and model misspecification. There is,
of course, a large literature on these topics, and we will not attempt to be exhaustive in
providing references; rather, our aims are: first, to give a short reminder on how Bayesian
inference is currently employed in Uncertainty Quantification (UQ); second, to identify
issues and popular beliefs about what one actually learns from Bayesian inference, and
thereby motivate the results of this paper; and, last, to present sufficient references that
the interested reader can find technical justification for the formal manipulations of this
subsection.
In this subsection, we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) where Φ is a known quantity
of interest function and µ† is an unknown (or partially known) probability measure on
X . For the purposes of exposition, in this subsection, we assume that X = Rk. One
example of a quantity of interest, when X = R, is Φ(µ†) := µ†[X ≥ a] (the probability
that the random variable X distributed according to µ† exceeds the threshold value a).
We also assume that we are given n independent samples d1, . . . , dn, each distributed
according to µ†.
We will now present the parametric Bayesian answer to this problem. For the pur-
poses of exposition, in this section, we restrict our attention to parametric Bayesian
inference. We first introduce {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ a family of probability distributions on X
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parametrized by θ ∈ Θ (and commonly referred to as the model class). For the sake of
simplicity here we also assume that Θ = R`. Let
A0 :=
{
µ( · , θ) ∣∣ θ ∈ Θ}.
Note that A0 is a subset of M(X ) that may or may not contain µ†. If µ† /∈ A0, then
the model is said to be misspecified ; otherwise, the model is said to be well specified.
We next introduce p0 ∈M(Θ), a probability distribution on Θ (the prior distribution
on θ). Let pi0 be the push-forward (measure) of p0 under the map θ 7→ µ( · , θ) (see
[22, 23], Sections 3.6, 3.7) and observe that pi0 is a probability distribution on A0, i.e.
pi0 ∈ M(A0), and that pi0 is the distribution of the random measure µ( · , θ) when θ is
distributed according to p0.
The next step is then to estimate Φ(µ†) via conditioning. Let pn ∈M(Θ) be the pos-
terior distribution of θ given the observation of the i.i.d. samples d1, . . . , dn, as obtained
using Bayes’ formula, and let pin be the push-forward of pn. The Bayesian estimate of
Φ(µ†) is therefore
Eµ∼pin [Φ(µ)]. (5.1)
For the purposes of exposition, we assume that the measures µ( · , θ) and µ† are all
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and write f( · , θ) and f †
for their densities, which we assume to be continuous. Similarly, we assume that the
measure p0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and, abusing
notation, write p0 for both the measure p0 and its (continuous) density, and similarly for
pn( · ), the posterior density of θ on Θ given the observation the samples d1, . . . , dn. We
will now examine the convergence properties of the sequence of posterior densities pn(θ)
as n → ∞. This analysis being classical (see for instance [79] and references therein),
our purpose is not to provide rigorous justifications but rather to familiarize the reader
with the mechanisms regarding the convergence of posteriors.
We have
pn(θ) =
p0(θ)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ)∫
Θ p0(θ
′)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ
′) dθ′
≡ p0(θ)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ)
Ep0 [
∏n
j=1 f(dj , · )]
which we write as
pn(θ) =
p0(θ)e
nLn(θ)∫
Θ p0(θ
′)enLn(θ′) dθ′
≡ p0(θ)e
nLn(θ)
Ep0 [enLn( · )]
,
where
Ln(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
log f(dj , θ).
Recall that
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ) is commonly known as the likelihood and Ln(θ) as the (sample)
average log-likelihood.
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Consistency and the Large-Sample Limit. Now observe that if log f(dj , θ) is in-
tegrable then it follows from the Law of Large Numbers that Ln(θ) converges almost
surely, as n→∞, to the expected log-likelihood L(θ) defined by
L(θ) :=
∫
X
f †(x) log
(
f(x, θ)
)
dx . (5.2)
Assuming that L(θ) has a unique maximizer θ∗ ∈ Θ (corresponding to the asymptotic
limit of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), as the number of data points goes
to infinity)and that p0 is strictly positive in every neighborhood of θ
∗, it follows under
regularity assumptions on f (or local strict convexity in the neighborhood of θ∗) that
pn(θ) converges, almost surely, as n → ∞, towards a Dirac mass supported at θ∗.
Therefore, assuming Φ to be sufficiently regular, the Bayesian posterior estimate of
Φ(µ†), i.e., ∫
Θ
Φ
(
µ( · , θ))pn(θ) dθ, (5.3)
converges almost surely as n→∞ to
Φ
(
µ( · , θ∗)). (5.4)
Note that
L(θ) = Ent(f †)−DKL
(
f †
∥∥f( · , θ)),
where Ent(f †) := − ∫X f †(x) log f †(x) dx is the entropy of f † and DKL denotes the
Kullback–Leibler divergence defined by
DKL
(
f †
∥∥f( · , θ)) := Ex∼f† [log f †(x)f(x, θ)
]
.
It follows that θ∗ is also the minimizer of DKL
(
f †
∥∥f( · , θ)) with respect to θ, i.e. the
MLE θ∗ is characterized by the property that µ( · , θ∗) is the distribution having minimal
relative entropy to µ† in the model class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ.
An immediate consequence of this observation is the fact if the model is not mis-
specified, i.e. if µ† is an element µ( · , θ†) of the model class, then θ∗ = θ†, µ( · , θ∗) = µ†,
and the Bayesian estimate (5.3) is asymptotically exact in the limit as n → ∞. In this
situation, the Bayesian estimate is said to be consistent.
This convergence result is known as the Bernstein–von Mises Theorem (see for in-
stance [79, Theorem 5]) or as the Bayesian Central Limit Theorem, since the limiting
posterior can even be described in a more refined way as being asymptotically normal
and not just a point mass. The condition that every open neighborhood of θ† has strictly
positive p0-probability (or, even more strongly, that the prior be globally supported) has
been named Cromwell’s Rule3 by Lindley [72].
3Since the posterior cannot possibly concentrate on a point outside the support of the prior, having
a globally-supported prior and hence not ruling out a priori any θ ∈ Θ as a possible θ† can be seen as
a Bayesian version of Oliver Cromwell’s famous injunction to the Synod of the Church of Scotland in
1650: “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.”
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Recent results [30, 61, 71, 79] on the Bernstein–von Mises phenomenon show a notable
dependence of the validity of the Bernstein–von Mises property upon subtle geometrical
and topological details, and regularity properties of the model and the data-generating
distribution. Therefore, it is to be expected that any general stability condition for
Bayesian inference would have to take account of such factors.
What Happens When the Model is Misspecified? To provide an illustrative
answer to this question, consider the family of Gaussian models {f( · , θ) | θ = (c, σ) ∈
R× R+}, where
f(x, c, σ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(x− c)
2
2σ2
)
.
What will happen when this model is exposed to data coming from a potentially non-
Gaussian truth µ†, with density f †, that has a well-defined mean c† and standard devi-
ation σ†? By the above considerations, θ∗ maximizes the expected log-likelihood (5.2)
with respect to θ, and the expected log-likelihood is simply
L(θ) = −
∫
R
f †(x)
(x− c)2
2σ2
dx− (log σ)
∫
R
f †(x) dx− log
√
2pi . (5.5)
A quick calculation using partial derivatives shows that θ∗ = (c∗, σ∗) maximizes (5.5) if
and only if c∗ = c† and σ∗ = σ†. That is, the Bayesian estimate (5.1) of Φ(µ†), for any
distribution µ† of mean c† and standard deviation σ†, converges almost surely as the
number of sample data goes to infinity, towards Φ
(
µ( · , (c†, σ†))), where µ( · , (c†, σ†)) is
the unique Gaussian distribution on R with mean c† and standard deviation σ†.
However, now there is a problem: there are many different probability distributions
µ on R that have the same first and second moments as µ† but have, say, different
higher-order moments, or different quantiles. Predictions of those other moments or
quantiles using µ( · , (c†, σ†)) can be inaccurate by orders of magnitude. A trivial, albeit
extreme, example is furnished by Φ(µ) := Eµ
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] (where cµ and σµ denote
the mean and standard deviation of µ). Under the Gaussian model, (defining erf(z) :=
1√
2pi
∫ z
−∞ e
− t2
s dt as the error function)
P
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = 1 + erf (− t√
2
)
,
whereas the extreme cases that prove the sharpness of Chebyshev’s inequality — in which
the probability measure is a discrete measure with support on at most three points in R
— have
P
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = min{1, 1
t2
}
.
In the case of the archetypically rare “6σ event”, the ratio between the two is approxi-
mately 1.4×107. This is, of course, an almost perversely extreme comparison: it would be
obvious to any observer with only moderate amounts of sample data that the data were
being drawn from a highly non-Gaussian distribution. However, it is not inconceivable
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that the true distribution µ† has a Gaussian-looking bulk but tails that are significantly
fatter than those of a Gaussian, and the difference may be difficult to establish using
reasonable amounts of sample data; yet, it is those tails that drive the occurrence of
“Black Swans”, catastrophically high-impact but low-probability outcomes. The results
of this paper suggest that this situation is generic, and cannot be avoided no matter how
many moments or integrals of arbitrary test functions of the truth µ† are matched nor
how “close” µ† is to the class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ.
5.3 Bayesian Inconsistency and Model Misspecification
To quote [79], “[w]hile for a Bayesian statistician the analysis ends in a certain sense with
the posterior, one can ask interesting questions about the the properties of posterior-
based inference from a frequentist point of view.” Many of these questions are asymptotic
in nature: for example, in the limit of infinitely many independent µ†-distributed sam-
ples, will the posterior converge in a suitable sense to µ† regardless of the initial choice
of prior pi? This property is referred to as consistency4; a general survey of consistency
results is found in [99]. As noted above, the consistency theorem is generically known as
the Bernstein–von Mises theorem [19, 96], although the earliest rigorous proofs are due
to Doob [38] and Le Cam [69].
Unfortunately, Cromwell’s Rule is only necessary, and not sufficient, to ensure con-
sistency. In fact, consistency is far from being a generic property, and once the prob-
ability space contains infinitely many points (and hence any parameter space Θ that
parametrizes all probability measures on that probability space is infinite-dimensional),
inconsistency is not the exception, but the rule [36]. In [48, Sec. 5], Freedman considered
a countable index set N := {1, 2, . . . } and the parameter space
Θ :=
{
θ : N→ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
θ(i) = 1
}
.
Each θ gives rise to a probability distribution Pθ = µ( · , θ) under which the observations
X1, X2, . . . are IID with Pθ[Xn = i] = θ(i). The problem is assumed to be well-specified,
so that one particular θ† ∈ Θ is considered to be the “true” parameter value, and the
frequentist data-generating distribution is µ† = Pθ† = µ( · , θ†). Theorem 5 of [48] shows
that, when supp(µ†) is infinite, given any “spurious” probability distribution Q = Pq,
there exists a prior probability measure pi on Θ that has θ† in its support, such that
the posterior of pi µ†-a.s. concentrates on q in the limit of observing infinitely many
i.i.d. µ†-distributed samples. In fact, there is a prior that gives positive mass to every
open subset of Θ but yields consistent posterior estimates for only a first-category set of
possible “true” (data-generating) parameter values θ†.
There are conditions on priors that do ensure consistency in infinite-dimensional or
non-parametric contexts, e.g. the tail-free priors introduced by Freedman in [48] and
hybrid Bayesian–frequentist tools such as Dirichlet process priors [52]. However, while
4Sometimes the term frequentist consistency is used, reflecting the fact that it lies outside the strict
Bayesian worldview.
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the collection of “bad” priors that lead to inconsistent results is measure-theoretically
small [38, 28], it is topologically generic [49].
Remark 5.1. It is probably fair to say that, despite their popularity and documented
successes, Bayesian methods have always attracted some degree of controversy and op-
position: see e.g. [51] and rejoinders for a recent academic discussion, and [73, 78] for
less formal treatments. Often, this opposition is philosophical in nature, particularly
with regard to the subjective interpretation of the probabilities involved, which is some-
thing that remains counter-intuitive to many commentators: see [44, par. 35 & 37] for
a recent example in law. However, there are also analytical reasons to be careful about
the application of Bayesian methods [88, 76, 43]. It is, in fact, now well understood that
Bayesian methods may fail to converge or may converge towards the wrong solution if
the underlying probability mechanism allows an infinite number of possible outcomes
[35] and that, in these non-finite-probability-space situations, this lack of convergence
(commonly referred to as Bayesian inconsistency) is the rule rather than the exception
[36]. There is now a wide literature of positive [19, 30, 38, 67, 69, 96, 92] and nega-
tive results [12, 35, 48, 47, 61, 71] on the consistency properties of Bayesian inference
in parametric and non-parametric settings, and an emerging understanding of the fine
topological and geometrical properties that determine (in)consistency.
It is important to appreciate that the requirement of positive prior mass in every
neighborhood of the true distribution depends upon the topology placed upon M(X ).
For example, Schwartz [86] shows that every pi that puts positive mass on all Kullback–
Leibler (relative entropy) neighborhoods of µ† is weakly consistent. On the other hand,
Freedman [48] and Diaconis & Freedman [35] show that pi may put positive mass on
all weak neighborhoods of µ† and still fail to be weakly consistent — e.g. by not be-
ing tail-free. Nor are results limited to weak convergence of the posterior to µ†. For
example, [9] shows that consistency holds in the Hellinger distance if pi puts positive
mass on all Kullback–Leibler neighborhoods of µ† and certain smoothness and tail con-
ditions are satisfied; see [98, 101] for further results on Hellinger and Kullback–Leibler
consistency. The amount of prior probability mass that lies Kullback–Leibler-close to
the truth, quantified using a notion called thickness, can be used to quantify the con-
vergence properties of Bayes estimates [1, 2, 74]. However, it is important to note that,
in the infinite-dimensional contexts that are increasingly subject to Bayesian analyses,
results like the Feldman-Ha´jek dichotomy [45, 56] suggest that probability measures
are ‘usually’ mutually singular and ‘rarely’ mutually absolutely continuous, and so the
Kullback–Leibler neighborhoods of µ† are ‘small’ sets that are ‘unlikely’ to intersect the
model class.
The situation in which there is no θ† ∈ Θ such that µ† = µ( · , θ†) is referred to as
model misspecification. The consistency and other asymptotic properties of misspecified
models appear to have first been considered by Berk [17, 18] and Huber [59]. See [66, 67]
for a recent contribution, and [74] for convergence rates.
“In practice, Bayesian inference is employed under misspecification all the
time, particularly so in machine learning applications. While sometimes it
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works quite well under misspecification [21, 66], there are also cases where
it does not [31, 50], so it seems important to determine precise conditions
under which misspecification is harmful — even if such an analysis is based
on frequentist assumptions.” [53]
There is a reasonable popular belief that gross misspecification of the model will be
detected by some means before engaging in a serious Bayesian analysis; indeed there do
exist tests [57, 106] for model misspecification, but it is important to note that while
one can determine that the model is misspecified, one cannot be sure that the model
is well-specified. There is also an understandable popular belief that these tests mean
that one need only be concerned with the situation of “mild misspecification”, and that
provided µ† lies “close enough” to the model class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ, the posterior estimates
will still converge to a usefully informative limit.
Remark 5.2. This belief echoes G. E. P. Box’s statement [26, p. 424] that “essentially,
all models are wrong, but some are useful” and question [26, p. 74] “Remember that
all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be
useful?”
In terms of the above discussion, one purpose of this paper is to explore the extent
to which one can simultaneously have robust Bayesian analyses that produce consistent
answers, given that the models used (both priors and likelihoods) are certain to be
misspecified to some degree. Can one be “just a little bit wrong” in terms of model
misspecification? Our results suggest that the answer is negative within the classical
framework of Bayesian Sensitivity analysis, when “closeness” is measured in terms of
total variation and Prokhorov metrics or in terms of a finite (but possibly large) number
of marginals of the data generating distribution.
In particular, one aim of Section 6 is to show that this belief is wrong if “mild
misspecification” is measured using the Prokhorov or the total variation metrics, the
number of samples is finite (but possibly arbitrarily large), and if convergence is required
to hold uniformly in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the model.
Remark 5.3. It is known from the Bernstein–von Mises theorem [19, 96] that, in finite-
dimensional situations, posterior values converge towards the quantity of interest if the
prior distribution has strictly positive mass in every neighborhood of the truth (see also
[69, 79]). It is also known that “even for the simplest infinite-dimensional models, the
Bernstein–von Mises theorem does not hold” [32, 47]. This possible lack of convergence,
referred to as the consistency problem, has been at the center of a debate between
frequentists and Bayesians. We quote Diaconis and Freedman [35] (see also [36])
“If the underlying mechanism allows an infinite number of possible outcomes
(e.g., estimation of an unknown probability on the integers), Bayes estimates
can be inconsistent: as more and more data comes in, some Bayesian statis-
ticians will become more and more convinced of the wrong answer.”
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What is the significance of Theorem 4.13 in that discussion? To answer this question,
consider Example 4.9 (and 4.19), in which one is interested in estimating the probability
(under the unknown measure µ†) that X exceeds a after observing n independent sam-
ples. We already know from [35, 32] that placing priors on the infinite-dimensional space
A = M[0, 1] of probability measures on [0, 1] is unlikely to lead to Bayesian posteriors
that will converge towards the true value as more and more data comes in. One strategy
to circumvent this lack of convergence would be to consider a finite-dimensional subset
of A, i.e. a family (µλ) of probability measures on [0, 1] indexed by a finite-dimensional
parameter λ ∈ Rk, put a strictly positive prior p on λ ∈ Rk, and then invoke the
Bernstein–von Mises theorem to guarantee the convergence of posterior values.
However, the Bernstein–von Mises theorem requires that the true distribution under
which the data is sampled belongs to {µλ | λ ∈ Rk}, the parametrized finite-dimensional
subset of A. What happens when this is not the case, i.e. the situation of misspecifi-
cation? Write pip for the push-forward of the prior p on λ ∈ Rk to a prior on A under
the map λ 7→ µλ. Assume that the data have been sampled from pi† · D where pi† is the
(frequentist) true distribution. Here Theorem 4.13, as illustrated in Example 4.16, can
be used to show that the posterior values of the quantity of interest under pip and pi
†
may lie near the opposite extreme values of Φ in A even if (1) pi† is a Dirac mass on a
measure µ† ∈ A; (2) the number of independent samples is large; and (3) k is large and
k moments of µ† and µλ∗ are equal for some λ∗ ∈ Rk.
Remark 5.4. One popular method for detecting failure of convergence under model
misspecification is to divide the data into data used for calibrating the parameters of
the model and data used for validating the accuracy or predictability of the (calibrated)
model. This approach, oftentimes described as “frequentist” [55, 11], could be used to
validate Bayesian calculations [43]. Although the detection (of the lack of predictability
of the model) is asymptotically robust, it requires the availability of sufficient data.
6 Brittleness under Local Misspecification
The purpose of this section is to present brittleness results with respect to local pertur-
bations in the total variation and Prokhorov metrics. Thus, whereas the examples given
for Theorem 4.13 highlighted that no finite number of common moments would be suf-
ficient to constrain two priors to give nearby posterior value for the quantity of interest,
this section shows that closeness in the TV and Prokhorov metrics is also insufficient to
ensure robustness.
We now establish a corollary to the proof of Theorem 4.13 which we will then use to
establish an extreme brittleness theorem for a model with local misspecification. Recall
that, for a map Ψ: A → Q, a map ψ : Ψ(A)→ A is called a section of Ψ if Ψ ◦ψ(q) = q
for all q ∈ Ψ(A).
Theorem 6.1. Let A be a Suslin space, let Φ: A → R be measurable, let Q be a
separable and metrizable space, and let Ψ: A → Q measurable. Let Q ⊆ M(Q) be such
that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Let the data space D be metrizable and consider
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of Conditions (6.1) and (6.2) of Theorem 6.1. If, for some data
map D ∈ D, all level sets of Ψ go to zero (i.e. for all q ∈ Ψ(A), infµ∈Ψ−1(q)D(µ)[B] =
0), then, for any positive section ψ of Ψ (i.e. Ψ ◦ ψ(q) = q and D(ψ(q))[B] > 0 for
q ∈ Ψ(A)), the least upper bound on posterior values is bounded from below by the
essential supremum of Φ ◦ ψ.
B ∈ B(D). Assume that D is such that all the level sets of Ψ go to zero, in the sense
that
inf
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
D(µ)[B] = 0, for all q ∈ Ψ(A). (6.1)
Then for any positive measurable section ψ of Ψ, positive in the sense that
D(ψ(q))[B] > 0, for all q ∈ Ψ(A), (6.2)
it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) ≥ Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ). (6.3)
where Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ) is the essential supremum
Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ) := sup
Q∈Q
inf
{
r ∈ R : Q[Φ ◦ ψ > r] = 0}. (6.4)
See Figure 6.1 for an illustration of Theorem 6.1.
We now use Theorem 6.1 to develop a brittleness theorem for a model with local
misspecification. To that end, let X be a Polish space so that, by [4, Thm.15.15],M(X )
endowed with the weak topology is Polish. Moreover, by [40, Thm. 11.3.3], we know
that if we select a complete consistent metric d for X , then the Prokhorov metric dM
defined by
dM(µ1, µ2) := inf {ε > 0 |µ1(A) ≤ µ2(Aε) + ε for all A ∈ B(X )} ,
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where
Aε :=
{
x ∈ X ∣∣ d(x, x′) < ε for some x′ ∈ A}
is the ε neighborhood of A, metrizes the weak topology onM(X ). Moreover, Prokhorov’s
theorem [40, Cor. 11.5.5] asserts that the Prokhorov metric dM is a complete metric for
the Polish spaceM(X ). For α > 0, µ ∈M(X ), let Bα(µ) := {µ′ ∈M(X ) | dM(µ, µ′) <
α} be the open ball of Prokhorov radius α about µ.
Let Θ be a Polish space and let the model define a map
P : Θ→M(X ).
As in Section 5.2, the image P(Θ) is referred to as the (Bayesian) model class.
Remark 6.2. When P is continuous, it follows from the definition [5, Sec. 3.2] of an
analytic set that the the image P(Θ) ⊆ M(X ) is analytic, and since the range space
M(X ) is Polish it follows that P(Θ) is Suslin. Actually, continuity is not required, since
[5, Thm. 3.3.4] implies that if P is measurable, then the image P(Θ) is Suslin. If, in
addition, P is injective, then Suslin’s Theorem [5, Thm. 3.2.3] implies that P(Θ) is Borel.
Assume that P is measurable and denote its image by A0 := P(Θ). Let piΘ ∈M(Θ)
be a prior distribution on Θ and let pi0 := PpiΘ ∈ M(A0) be its pushforward. Let
Φ0 : M(X ) → R be a measurable quantity of interest. We are interested in estimating
Φ0 using the prior pi0 and our purpose is to show the extreme brittleness of this estimation
under arbitrarily small perturbations of the model class A0 in both the Prokhorov and
total variation metrics.
For conditioning on observations, let the data space be D := X n, and consider the
n-i.i.d. sample data map Dn0 : M(X )→M(X n) defined by
Dn0µ := µn, µ ∈M(X ) . (6.5)
For xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, dropping the notational dependence, denote the rectangle
about xn by
Bnδ :=
n∏
i=1
Bδ(xi), (6.6)
where Bδ(xi) is the open ball of radius δ about xi. Observe that the prior value of Φ0
under pi0 is Epi0 [Φ0] and its posterior value under the observation d ∈ Bnδ is Epi0Bn
δ
Dn0 [Φ0].
To define α-perturbations of the model class A0 in Prokhorov metric, we introduce,
for α > 0 the α-neighborhood Aα ⊆M(X ) of A0 defined by (see Figure 6.2)
Aα :=
⋃
µ∈A0
Bα(µ). (6.7)
It is easy to see that the ball fibration (see Remark 6.8)
A := {(µ1, µ2) ∈M(X )×M(X ) |µ1 ∈ A0, µ2 ∈ Bα(µ1)} (6.8)
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Figure 6.2: The original model class A0 (black curve) is enlarged to its metric neighbor-
hood Aα (shaded). This procedure determines perturbations µα ∈ Aα of the original
random measure µ0 ∈ A0.
of the set of balls about points of A0 projects to
P0A = A0 (6.9)
PαA = Aα (6.10)
where P0 : M(X )×M(X )→M(X ) is the projection onto the first component and Pα
the projection onto the second. The naturally induced set of priors corresponding to
pi0 ∈M(A0) is therefore the set Πα ⊂M(Aα) defined by
Πα :=
{
piα ∈M(Aα)
∣∣∃pi ∈M(A) with P0pi = pi0 and Pαpi = piα} . (6.11)
Remark 6.3. Observe that each element piα ∈ Πα is the distribution of a random
measure µ2 onAα such that: (i) there exists a random measure µ1 ∈ A0 with distribution
pi0 (that of the model); (ii) (µ1, µ2) is jointly measurable; and (iii) with probability one
the Prokhorov distance from µ2 to µ1 is less than α, i.e. dM(µ1, µ2) < α. Observe in
particular that pi0 ∈ Πα.
Our main result is provided in Theorem 6.9 but for the sake of clarity we will first
give this result in the following (simpler) form.
Theorem 6.4. Using the notations introduced above and the data map (6.5), let Πα be
defined as in (6.11). If
lim
δ↓0
sup
x∈X
sup
θ∈Θ
P(θ)[Bδ(x)] = 0, (6.12)
then, for all α > 0 there exists δc(α) > 0 such that for all 0 < δ < δc(α), all n ∈ N, and
all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ ess suppi0(Φ0),
where
ess suppi0(Φ0) := inf{r > 0 | pi0[φ0 > r] = 0},
and with similar expressions for the lower bounds L.
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Remark 6.5. Theorem 6.4 implies the extreme brittleness of Bayesian inference under
local misspecification. Indeed, assume that the model class A0 is well specified (i.e. it
contains the truth µ†) and that, therefore, the Bayesian estimator described by pi0 is
consistent. One may believe that a model A1 lying in a ‘small enough’ neighborhood
of A0 should have good convergence properties, Theorem 6.4 and Remark 6.3 invalidate
this belief, at least as far as the TV and Prokhorov notions of ‘small enough’ are con-
cerned. Using the notations of Remark 6.3, observe in particular that an unscrupulous
practitioner may design a model corresponding to a random measure µ2 such that the
distance between µ1 (the well specified model) and µ2 is a.s. at most α (where α is
arbitrarily small) and the posterior value using the random measure µ2 is as distant as
possible from the posterior value using µ1 irrespective of the sample size n.
Remark 6.6. Observe that the condition (6.12) is extremely weak and satisfied for most
Bayesian models. This condition can in fact be made weaker by replacing it with the
assumption that for n sufficiently large it holds true that for all θ, P(θ) does not contain
a Dirac mass in each ball Bδ(xi) (i.e. on the sample data when δ ↓ 0). We also note that
the proof of Theorem 6.4 does not require the samples to be i.i.d., in particular, the same
results can be obtained with coupled samples, if, for instance, the data map Dn0 is replaced
by a data map D such that Cn1
∏n
i=1 µ(Ai) ≤ D(µ)[A1 × · · · × An] ≤ Cn2
∏n
i=1 µ(Ai) for
strictly positive constants C1 and C2.
Remark 6.7. Theorem 6.4 is a corollary of Theorem 6.9 and the proof of Theorem 6.9
shows that, if Θ is compact and P is continuous and Φ(µ) := µ(A) for some fixed A ∈
B(X ), then the result of Theorem 6.4 also holds when using the total variation distance
dTV instead of the Prokhorov distance, which produces a much smaller neighborhood.
However, in this metricM(X ) in general is not separable and this introduces measur-
ability difficulties. These difficulties can be overcome somewhat when Θ is compact and
P is continuous, since the image of a compact set under a continuous map is compact
and therefore measurable. Moreover, validation or certification type quantities of inter-
est defined by Φ(µ) := µ(A) for some fixed A ∈ B(X ) are easily seen to be continuous
and therefore measurable. Moreover, because of continuity,
Π∞0 (Φ0) ≈ Π∞α (Φ0).
Our motivation in working mainly with the Prokhorov metric lies in the fact that we
also seek to lay down measurability foundations for the scientific computation of optimal
statistical estimators where the unknown quantities are products of functions and mea-
sures and for such spaces the total variation metric is too strong for the measurability
of standard quantities of interest.
We will now give a more general version of Theorem 6.4 and elaborate on the objects
entering in its formulation. We start with ΠΘ ⊆ M(Θ), a set of admissible priors and
let
Π0 := PΠΘ ⊆M(A0)
denote the push-forward by the model P. We consider the pull-back ΦΘ := Φ0◦P, of the
measurable quantity of interest Φ0 : M(X ) → R, to a measurable quantity of interest
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ΦΘ : Θ → R. Then the change of variables formula [40, Thm. 4.1.11] implies that, for
piΘ ∈M(Θ),
EpiΘ [ΦΘ] = EpiΘ [Φ0 ◦ P] = EPpiΘ [Φ0]
whenever either side is well defined. Therefore, taking suprema and infima, we obtain
U(ΠΘ) = U(Π0),
L(ΠΘ) = L(Π0),
where we note that the quantity of interest implicit in these definitions is determined by
the argument. For α > 0, define Aα, A, P0 and Pα as in (6.7), (6.8), (6.9) and (6.10).
Remark 6.8. Using the affine convexity of M(X ), one can show that A is indeed a
Hurewicz fibration, in that it has the homotopy lifting property, see e.g. [91, p. 66]. Let
d−1M(< α) := {(µ1, µ2) | dM(µ1, µ2) < α}
denote the set of all pairs of measures at Prokhorov distance at most α from one another.
Since dM : M(X ) ×M(X ) → R is continuous, it follows that d−1M(< α) is open and
therefore Borel. In addition, since A0 ⊆ M(X ) is Suslin it follows that A0 ×M(X ) ⊆
M(X )×M(X ) is Suslin. Therefore, since A = d−1M(< α)∩
(A0×M(X )), it follows that
A is Suslin.
Observe that the measurable quantity of interest Φ0 : M(X ) → R acting on the
second component of M(X ) ×M(X ), naturally pulls back to the quantity of interest
Φ: M(X )×M(X )→ R by Φ := Φ0◦Pα, and we have supAα Φ0 = supAΦ and infAα Φ0 =
infAΦ, i.e.
U(Aα) = U(A),
L(Aα) = L(A).
For a subset Π0 ⊆ M(A0), the projection identity (6.9) implies that the set Π :=
P−10 Π0 defined by P
−1
0 Π0 := {pi ∈ M(A) | P0pi ∈ Π0} is the induced set of probability
measures on A. Moreover, for pi ∈ Π, the change of variables formula
Epi[Φ] = Epi[Φ0 ◦ Pα] = EPαpi[Φ0]
implies that
sup
pi∈Π
Epi[Φ] = sup
piα∈PαΠ
Epiα [Φ0],
inf
pi∈Π
Epi[Φ] = inf
piα∈PαΠ
Epi[Φ0],
so that
PαΠ = PαP
−1
0 Π0 ⊆M(Aα)
is the induced set of probability measures on Aα. Let us denote this induced set by
Πα := PαP
−1
0 Π0, (6.13)
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so that these equalities become
U(Π) = U(Πα),
L(Π) = L(Πα).
For conditioning on observations, define Dn0 as in (6.5) and pull it back to the data
map Dn : M(X ) ×M(X ) → M(X n) defined by Dn := Dn0 ◦ Pα. Define Bnδ as in (6.6)
and recall the definition (4.1)
EpiDn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼pi[Φ(µ1, µ2)Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]]E(µ1,µ2)∼pi[Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]] .
of the conditional expectation and the corresponding (4.5) upper value
U(Π|Bnδ ) := sup
piDn∈ΠBn
δ
Dn
EpiDn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ]
in terms of the admissible set (4.3)
ΠBnδ :=
{
pi ∈ Π : (pi · Dn)[Bnδ ] > 0
}
of product measures, where the marginal is defined by
(pi · Dn)[Bnδ ] := E(µ1,µ2)∼pi
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
.
Let us indicate the dependence on some measure pi of the essential supremum of
some quantity of interest Φ by
pi∞(Φ) := inf {r ∈ R |pi{Φ > r} = 0}
and, for a set Π of measures, let
Π∞(Φ) := sup
pi∈Π
pi∞(Φ). (6.14)
For piα = Pαpi with pi ∈ Π, we have
piα[Φ0 > r] =
(
Pαpi
)
[Φ0 > r]
= pi[Φ0 ◦ Pα > r]
= pi[Φ > r]
so that we conclude that
Π∞(Φ) = Π∞α (Φ0).
Let us now quantify a type of regularity for the model P. For x ∈ X , let B0(x) := {x}
and define
P∞(δ) := sup
x∈X
sup
θ∈Θ
P(θ)[Bδ(x)], for δ ≥ 0.
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It is clear that P∞ : R+ → [0, 1] is an increasing function. Moreover, for most parametric
families, it is easy to show that P∞ is continuous and P∞(0) = 0, and for many of them
not difficult to find useful upper bounds.
Finally, let us assume that the model P is positive, in that µ(Bδ(x)) > 0 for all
µ ∈ A0, x ∈ X , and δ > 0. Theorem 6.4 is a direct consequence of the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.9 (Brittleness under Local Misspecification). With the notation and as-
sumptions above, let Πα be defined as in (6.13), and let δ > 0 and 0 < α < 1 satisfy
P∞(δ) < α.
Then, using Dn0 for the distribution of the data, for all integers n ≥ 1,
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ0)
with similar expressions for the lower bounds L.
Remark 6.10. When Cromwell’s rule (see Section 5.2) is implemented (i.e. if the prior
measure of every non-empty neighborhood is strictly positive), it follows that Π∞0 (Φ0) =
U(A0) so that the conclusion of Theorem 6.9 becomes
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ U(A0) .
Remark 6.11. Theorem 6.9 provides conditions sufficient to guarantee how bad things
can get regardless of how many samples are taken. One might hope that when these
conditions are not satisfied, that more samples may prove beneficial. However, when the
condition
inf
(µ,µ′)∈Ψ−1µ
Dn(µ, µ′)[Bnδ ] = 0, µ ∈ A0
of Theorem 6.1 is only approximately satisfied, the inequality
Dn(µ, µ′)[Bnδ ] =
(
µ′
)n
[Bnδ ] =
n∏
i=1
µ′[Bδ(xi)]
and the quantitative version of Theorem 4.13 (given in [80, Thm. 3.1], see also [80,
Rmk. 3.2]) imply that things actually get ‘worse’ with more samples.
7 Conclusions and Further Developments
In this paper, we have looked at the robustness of Bayesian Inference in the classical
framework of Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis. In that (classical) framework, the data is
fixed, and one computes optimal bounds on (i.e. the sensitivity of) posterior values with
respect to variations of the prior in a given class of priors. Although robustness is already
well established when the class of priors is finite dimensional, we observe that, under
general conditions, when the class of priors is finite codimensional, the optimal bounds
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on posterior values are as large as possible, no matter the number of data points. Our
motivation for specifying a finite codimensional class of priors is to look at what classical
Bayesian sensitivity analysis would conclude under finite information, and the best way
to understand this notion of “brittleness under finite information” is through the simple
example provided in Subsection 1.2.
The mechanism causing this “brittleness” has its origin in the fact that, in classical
Bayesian sensitivity analysis, optimal bounds on posterior values are computed after the
observation of the specific value of the data, and that the probability of observing the
data under some feasible prior may be arbitrarily small (the example given in Subsection
1.3 provides an illustration of this phenomenon). This data dependence of worst priors is
inherent to this classical framework and the resulting brittleness under finite information
can be seen as an extreme occurrence of the dilation phenomenon (the fact that optimal
bounds on prior values may become less precise after conditioning) observed in classical
robust Bayesian inference [103]. Although these worst priors do depend on the data,
“look nasty”, and make the probability of observing the data very small, they are not
“isolated pathologies” but directions of instability (of Bayesian conditioning) and their
number increase with the number of data points. The example given in Subsection 1.4
provides an illustration of this point and also suggests that learning and robustness are,
to some degree, antagonistic properties: a strong constraint on the probability of the
data makes the method robust but learning impossible and, as the constraint is relaxed,
learning becomes possible but posterior values become brittle.
Since “brittleness under finite information” appears to be inherent to classical Bayesian
Sensitivity Analysis (in which worst priors are computed given the specific value of the
data), one may ask whether robustness could be established under finite information by
exiting the strict framework of Robust Bayesian Inference and computing the sensitivity
of posterior conclusions independently of the specific value of the data. To investigate
this question, Hampel and Cuevas’ notion of qualitative robustness has been generalized
in [81] to Bayesian inference based on the quantification of the sensitivity of the distri-
bution of the posterior distribution with respect to perturbations of the prior and the
data generating distribution, in the limit when the number of data points grows towards
infinity. Note that, contrary to classical Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis considered here,
in the qualitative formulation the data is not fixed and posterior values are therefore
analyzed as dynamical systems randomized through the distribution of the data. To ex-
press finite information, the total variation, Prokhorov, and Ky Fan metrics have been
used to quantify perturbations and sensitivities.
Since this notion of qualitative robustness is established in the limit when the num-
ber of data points grows towards infinity, it is natural to expect that the notion of
consistency (i.e. the property that posterior distributions convergence towards the data
generating distribution) will play an important role. Although consistency is primarily
a frequentist notion, it is also equivalent to intersubjective agreement which means that
two Bayesians will ultimately have very close predictive distributions. Therefore, it also
has importance for Bayesians. Fortunately, not only are there mild conditions which
guarantee consistency, but the Bernstein–von Mises theorem goes further in providing
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mild conditions under which the posterior is asymptotically normal. The most famous of
these are Doob [38], Le Cam and Schwartz [70], and Schwartz [86, Thm. 6.1]. Moreover,
the assumptions needed for this consistency are so mild that one can be lead to the
conclusion that the prior does not really matter once there is enough data. For example,
we quote Edwards, Lindeman and Savage [42]:
“Frequently, the data so completely control your posterior opinion that there
is no practical need to attend to the details of your prior opinion.”
To some, the consistency results appeared to generate more confidence than possibly
they should. We quote A. W. F. Edwards [41, p. 60]:
“It is sometimes said, in defence of the Bayesian concept, that the choice of
prior distribution is unimportant in practice, because it hardly influences the
posterior distribution at all when there are moderate amounts of data. The
less said about this ’defence’ the better.”
[81] shows that the Edwards defence is essentially what produces non qualitative ro-
bustness in Bayesian inference. In particular, the assumptions required for consistency
(e.g. the assumption that the prior has Kullback–Leibler support at the parameter value
generating the data) are such that arbitrarily small local perturbations of the prior distri-
bution (near the data generating distribution) results in consistency or non-consistency,
and therefore have large impacts on the asymptotic behavior of posterior distributions.
These mechanisms are different and complementary to those discovered by Hampel and
developed by Cuevas, and they suggest that consistency and robustness are, to some
degree, antagonistic requirements (a careful selection of the prior is important if both
properties, or their approximations, are to be achieved) and also indicate that misspec-
ification generates non qualitative robustness.
In conclusion, the exploration of Bayesian inference in a continuous world has re-
vealed both positive and negative results. However, positive results regarding the clas-
sical or qualitative robustness of Bayesian inference under finite information have yet to
be obtained. To that end, observe that the example provided in Subsection 1.4 suggests
that there may be a missing stability condition for Bayesian inference in a continuous
world under finite information akin to the CFL condition for the stability of a discrete
numerical scheme used to approximate a continuous PDE. Although numerical schemes
that do not satisfy the CFL condition may look grossly inadequate, the existence of such
perverse examples certainly does not imply the dismissal of the necessity of a stabil-
ity condition. Similarly, although one may, as in the example provided in Subsection
1.3, exhibit grossly perverse worst priors, the existence of such priors does not inval-
idate the need for a study of stability conditions for using Bayesian Inference under
finite information. The example of Subsection 1.4 suggests that, in the framework of
Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis, under finite information, such a stability condition would
strongly depend on how well the probability of the data is known or constrained in
the model class in addition to the class of priors and the resolution of the measure-
ments. It is natural to expect that such robustness and stability questions will increase
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in importance as Bayesian methods increase in popularity due to the availability of com-
putational methodologies and environments to compute the posteriors. Indeed, when
posterior distributions are approximated using such methods, the robustness analysis
naturally includes not only quantifying sensitivities with respect to the data generating
distribution and the choice of prior, but also the analysis of convergence and stability of
the computational method. This is particularly true in Bayesian updating where Bayes’
rule is applied iteratively and computed posterior distributions become prior distribu-
tions for the next iteration. Oftentimes these posterior distributions (which are then
treated as prior distributions) are only approximated (e.g. via MCMC methods) and
the Brittleness results discussed here and in [81] suggest that having strong convergence
(of these MCMC methods) in TV would not be enough to ensure stability. At a higher
level, these results appear to suggest that robust inference (in a continuous world under
finite information) should be done with reduced/coarse models rather than highly so-
phisticated/complex models (and the level of “coarseness/reduction” would depend on
the available “finite information”).
8 Proofs
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.6
For q ∈ Rn, define
Π(q) := Ψ−1Q = {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[Ψ] = q}
and let Π(q, n) := Π(q) ∩ ∆(n) ⊆ Π(q) be the subset consisting of (n + 1)-fold convex
combinations of Dirac masses. Using a ‘layercake’ approach, we use the fact that
Π(Z) =
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q) and Π(Z, n) =
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q, n),
while applying Theorem 3.4 with equality constraints Π(q), q ∈ Rn, and the fact that
the supremum over a union is a supremum of suprema to obtain a reduction as follows:
U(Π(Z)) = U
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q)

= sup
q∈Z
U(Π(q))
= sup
q∈Z
U(Π(q, n))
= U
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q, n)

= U(Π(Z, n)),
which completes the proof.
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8.2 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Since T ⊂ Q is a subset of a separable metrizable space, [4, Cor. 3.5] implies that it
is itself separable and metrizable. Consider the set-valued map with non-empty values
Ψ−1 : T  A with graph G defined by
G := {(q, µ) ∈ T ×A |Ψ(µ) = q} . (8.1)
Let d be a metric that generated the topology of T and define h : T × A → R by
h(q, µ) := d(Ψ(µ), q). Then, since d is continuous in each of its arguments, it follows
that h is a Carathe´odory function, as defined in Definition 9.2. Since T is separable and
metrizable, Lemma 9.3 implies that h is B(T )⊗ B(A)-measurable. Rewriting Equation
(8.1) as
G := {(q, µ) ∈ T ×A |h(q, µ) = 0}
yields that G belongs to B(T ) ⊗ B(A). Lemma 9.1 (through the identification S = A,
s = µ, ϕ(t, s) = Φ(µ)) implies that the function U ◦ Ψ−1 : T → R defined for q ∈ T by
q 7→ supµ∈Ψ−1(q) Φ(µ) is B̂(T )-measurable, thereby establishing the first assertion. The
second assertion then follows from the second part of Lemma 9.1.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3.11
For the first assertion, consider Q ∈ Q. Then, by the second assertion of Lemma 3.10,
there exists a B̂(suppQ)-measurable section ψ of Ψ, i.e. a B̂(supp(Q))-measurable func-
tion ψ : supp(Q)→ A such that Ψ(ψ(q)) = q for all q ∈ supp(Q). Let Q also denote its
restriction to its support and Q̂ its completion. Let pi := ψQ̂ ∈ M(A), so that, for all
A ∈ B(supp(Q)), (
Ψpi
)
(A) =
(
ΨψQ̂
)
(A)
=
(
(Ψ ◦ ψ)Q̂)(A)
= Q̂(A)
= Q(A).
Hence, Ψpi = Q, establishing the first assertion.
For the main assertion, observe that, for all µ ∈ A,(U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ)(µ) = sup
µ′:Ψ(µ′)=Ψ(µ)
Φ(µ′) ≥ Φ(µ). (8.2)
Consequently, for Q ∈ Q, the first assertion shows that there is a pi such that Ψpi = Q,
so that a change of variables (Proposition 9.7) and the monotonicity properties (Propo-
sition 9.4) of these integrals, together with the inequality (8.2), imply that
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨpi[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Epi[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
≥ Epi[Φ],
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and therefore
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Epi[Φ].
Consequently,
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Epi[Φ] = U(Ψ−1Q)
and, in particular,
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ U(Ψ−1Q). (8.3)
To obtain the reverse inequality, for δ > 0 consider Q ∈ Q and apply Lemma 3.10
to conclude that there exists a δ-optimal B̂(supp(Q))-measurable section of Ψ; that
is, a B̂(supp(Q))-measurable function ψ : supp(Q) → A such that Ψ(ψ(q)) = q for
all q ∈ supp(Q) and (Φ ◦ ψ)(q) > (U ◦ Ψ−1)(q) − δ for all q ∈ supp(Q). Now let
pi := ψQ̂ ∈ M(A), and observe from the proof of the first assertion that Ψpi = Q, and
therefore pi ∈ Ψ−1Q. Therefore, by a change of variables,
Epi[Φ] = EψQ̂[Φ]
= EQ̂[Φ ◦ ψ]
> EQ̂[U ◦Ψ−1]− δ.
Since, by definition, EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] := EQ̂[U ◦Ψ−1], it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
pi∈Ψ−1Q
Epi[Φ]
≥ sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1]− δ.
Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≥ sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1].
Recalling the reverse inequality (8.3), we obtain the main assertion.
The assertion of measure affinity follows from Lemma 9.9.
For the assertion (4.10), define
Π := {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n} .
Let  > 0. Assume that suppi+∈Π+ Epi+
[
Φ
]
> λ and that pi+ ∈ Π+ is such that Epi+
[
Φ
]
>
λ. Observe that pi := pi+/pi+(A) is an element of Π that satisfies Epi
[
Φ − λψ0
]
> 0.
Define Πn as in (3.9) and apply [82, Thm. 4.1] to suppi∈Π Epi
[
Φ− λψ0
]
to conclude that
there exists pi∗ ∈ Πn such that Epi∗
[
Φ − λψ0
]
> 0. Since Φ − λψ0 = (ϕ − λ)ψ0 and ψ0
is positive, it also follows that Epi∗
[
ψ0
]
> 0. Writing pi∗+ := pi∗/Epi∗ [ψ0] we obtain that
pi∗+ ∈ Π+,n and Epi∗+
[
Φ
]
> λ, which concludes the proof of (4.10).
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8.4 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider the set
Y ′ :=
⋃
{Oy | Oy ⊆ Y is open and ν(Oy) = 0} .
First let us show that E = Y ′. To see this, first observe that trivially we have E ⊆ Y ′.
Now suppose that y ∈ Y ′. Then there exists a y′ ∈ Y and an open Oy′ 3 y′ such that
y ∈ Oy′ and ν(Oy′) = 0. Therefore, y ∈ E and hence E = Y ′.
Now, since Y ′ is a union of open sets, it is open and therefore measurable. Moreover,
since Y is strongly Lindelo¨f, it follows that Y ′ is Lindelo¨f and that the open cover of Y ′
by ν-null open sets used in the definition of Y ′ has a countable subcover, so that
Y ′ =
⋃
i∈N
Oyi
where each Oyi is open and has ν(Oyi) = 0. It follows that
ν(E) = ν(Y ′) ≤
∑
i∈N
ν(Oyi) = 0
and the proof is finished.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 4.7
The first assertion, (4.9), follows by layering the set of positive measures of finite total
mass as
⋃
r∈R+{rM(A)}, using the fact that the supremum over a union is a supremum
of suprema, and applying the reduction theorem [82, Thm. 4.1] in rM(A) separately.
For the second assertion, (4.10), define
Π := {pi ∈M(A) |Epi[ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n}
Let  > 0. Assume that suppi+∈Π+ Epi+
[
Φ
]
> λ and that pi+ ∈ Π+ is such that Epi+
[
Φ
]
>
λ. Observe that pi := pi+/pi+(A) is an element of Π that satisfies Epi
[
Φ − λψ0
]
> 0.
Defining Πn as in (3.9) and applying [82, Thm. 4.1] to suppi∈Π Epi
[
Φ− λψ0
]
, we deduce
that there exists pi∗ ∈ Πn such that Epi∗
[
Φ− λψ0
]
> 0. Since Φ− λψ0 = (ϕ− λ)ψ0 and
ψ0 is positive, it also follows that Epi∗
[
ψ0
]
> 0. Let pi∗+ := pi∗/Epi∗ [ψ0] to obtain that
pi∗+ ∈ Π+,n and Epi∗+
[
Φ
]
> λ, which concludes the proof of (4.10).
8.6 Proof of Theorem 4.8
First, we prove that
U(Π(q)|B) = sup
pi+∈Π+(q)
Eµ∼pi+
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
, (8.4)
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where Π+(q) is the set of positive finite measures pi+ on A such that Epi+
[
Ψ(µ)− q] = 0
and Epi+
[
D(µ)[B]
]
= 1. To that end, first observe that
U(Π(q)|B) = sup
pi∈Π(q):piD[B]>0
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B]
and that, for any pi ∈ Π(q) such that pi  D[B] > 0,
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (8.5)
Now consider pi ∈ Π(q) such that pi  D[B] > 0. Then pi+ := pi/Epi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
is an
element of Π+(q) and (8.5) implies that
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi+[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]].
Conversely, if pi+ ∈ Π+(q), then pi := pi+/pi+[A] is an element of Π(q) such that pi 
D[B] > 0 and
Eµ∼pi+
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
=
Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] .
Since the above argument also shows that Π(q)B D is nonempty if and only if Π+(q)
is nonempty, (8.4) follows. The right hand side of (8.4) is a linear program in pi+, so
Theorem 4.7 implies that the supremum in pi+ can be achieved by assuming pi+ to be
the weighted sum of at most n+ 1 Dirac masses, i.e. by assuming that
pi+ =
n∑
i=0
αiδµi . (8.6)
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.8.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 4.11
First let us show that, for λ ∈ R, the statement that
EpiD[Φ|B] > λ, pi ∈ (Ψ−1(Q))B (8.7)
is equivalent to the statement that
Eµ∼pi
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] > 0. (8.8)
To that end, assume (8.7) and observe that the definition (4.3) of (Ψ−1(Q))B implies
that pi · D[B] > 0, where, by (4.4),
pi · D[B] := Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
. (8.9)
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Consequently, by (4.1),
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼pi[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
] > λ,
and the denominator is strictly positive. Therefore,
Eµ∼pi
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]]
= Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]− λEµ∼pi[D(µ)[B]]
> 0,
and (8.8) follows. Conversely, assume (8.8) and observe that pi · D[B] > 0. To see this,
observe that, if pi · D[B] = 0, then (8.9) implies that D(µ)[B] = 0 pi-a.s. and so
Eµ∼pi
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] = 0,
which is a contradiction. Consequently, pi · D[B] > 0 and dividing the assumption
Eµ∼pi
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]]
= Eµ∼pi
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]− λEµ∼pi[D(µ)[B]]
> 0
by pi ·D[B] := Eµ∼pi
[
D(µ)[B]
]
throughout yields (8.7) and the equivalence is established.
The main assertion now follows from a direct application of Theorem 3.11. Finally,
since Φ is semibounded, it follows that µ 7→ Φ(µ)D(µ)[B] is semibounded and measur-
able, and the measure-affinity assertion follows from Lemma 9.9.
8.8 Proof of Theorem 4.13
Let us first establish that the assumptions of the theorem are well defined. To that end,
note that Lemma 3.10 implies that q 7→ infµ∈Ψ−1(q)D(µ)[B] is B̂(supp(Q))-measurable
and hence (4.16) is well defined. Similarly (4.17) is well defined.
For the proof of the theorem, fix δ > 0, let Q ∈ Q and D ∈ D satisfy the assump-
tions, and define λ := U(A) − δ. Since (Φ(µ) − λ)D(µ)[B] is bounded and measurable,
Lemma 3.10 implies that the function q 7→ θ(q) := supµ∈Ψ−1(q)(Φ(µ) − λ)D(µ)[B] is
B̂(supp(Q))-measurable. Moreover, (4.16) implies that the function θ is non-negative
with Q-probability one and (4.17) implies that θ is strictly positive on a subset of strictly
positive Q-measure. Hence,
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
= EQ[θ] > 0,
and, therefore,
sup
Q∈Q
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
> 0.
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It then follows from Theorem 4.11 that U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ λ = U(A) − δ. Since δ > 0 was
arbitrary, it follows that U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ U(A). Theorem 4.5 implies that
U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≤ U(A)
and the theorem follows.
8.9 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We will need the following notation: for an admissible set Π ⊆ M(A) of priors, an
observation map D, and an open subset B ⊆ D, let Π B D be the set of probability
distributions pi  D on A×D generated by pi ∈ Π:
ΠB D := {pi  D | pi ∈ Π and (pi · D)[B] > 0}.
We also define
U(ΠB D) := sup
piD∈ΠBD
EpiD
[
Φ
∣∣B].
The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 4.13 as follows. Let δ > 0, and let
a measurable section ψ satisfy the assumptions. Define λ := Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ) − δ, and
the universally measurable function q 7→ θ(q) := supµ∈Ψ−1(q)(Φ(µ) − λ)D(µ)[B]. Then
assumption (6.1) implies that the function θ is non-negative. It follows from the definition
(6.14) of Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ), and λ < Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ), that there is a Q ∈ Q such that Φ ◦ ψ > λ
with nonzero Q-measure. Since
θ(q) = sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
≥ (Φ ◦ ψ(q)− λ)D(ψ(q))[B],
the positivity assumption (6.2) implies that θ is positive on a subset of positive Q-
measure. Hence,
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
= EQ[θ] > 0
and, therefore,
sup
Q∈Q
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
> 0.
It then follows from Theorem 4.11 that
U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ λ = Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ)− δ.
Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, the assertion is proved.
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8.10 Proof of Theorem 6.9
We appeal to the corollary, Theorem 6.1, to Theorem 4.13. To that end, let A be defined
as in (6.8), and let Q := A0, Ψ := P0, D := {Dn}.
Since Dn = Dn0 ◦ Pα is a pull-back,
(pi · Dn)[Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼pi
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
= E(µ1,µ2)∼pi
[
Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
= Eµ2∼Pαpi
[
Dn0 (µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
= (Pαpi · Dn0 )[Bnδ ],
from which we conclude that (Pαpi · Dn0 )[Bnδ ] > 0 if and only if (pi · Dn)[Bnδ ] > 0, and so
conclude
Πα Bnδ Dn0 = Pα
(
ΠBnδ Dn
)
,
where Pα acts on each component in the natural way. Moreover since Φ = Φ0 ◦ Pα is
also a pull-back, for pi ∈ Π, we have
EpiDn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼pi[Φ(µ1, µ2)Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]]E(µ1,µ2)∼pi[Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]]
=
E(µ1,µ2)∼pi
[
Φ0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2) · Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
E(µ1,µ2)∼pi
[
Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
=
Eµ2∼Pαpi
[
Φ0(µ2)Dn0 (µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
Eµ2∼Pαpi
[
Dn0 (µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
= EPαpiDn0
[
Φ0
∣∣Bnδ ]
and so we conclude that
U(ΠBnδ Dn) = U(Πα Bnδ Dn0 ). (8.10)
We will now need the following proposition
Proposition 8.1. Define the total variation metric dTV on M(X ) by
dTV(µ1, µ2) := sup
A∈B(X )
|µ1(A)− µ2(A)|.
Consider B ∈ B(X ). Then for µ ∈M(X ) such that µ(B) < 1, we have
dTV(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B).
Proof. For A ∈ B(X ), we have
µ(A)− µ|Bc(A) = µ(A)− µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
= µ(A ∩B) + µ(A ∩Bc)− µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
= µ(A ∩B)− µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(A ∩B
c)
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and therefore
µ(A)− µ|Bc(A) ≤ µ(A ∩B) ≤ µ(B)
and
µ(A)− µ|Bc(A) ≥ − µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(A ∩B
c)
≥ − µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(B
c)
= −µ(B) ,
thus establishing the assertion.
For B ∈ B(X ) and µ ∈ M(X ) such that µ(B) < 1, the conditional measure µ|Bc ∈
M(X ) is defined by
µ|Bc(A) := µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
, A ∈ B(X ).
It follows from Proposition 8.1 that dTV(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B) and since dM ≤ dTV (see
e.g. [60, Eq. 2.24]), we conclude that
dM(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B). (8.11)
Let Bδ := Bδ(x1) denote the ball about the first sample of x
n = (x1, . . . , xn). Then,
for µ0 ∈ A0, it follows from the assumptions that
dM(µ0, µ0|Bcδ ) ≤ µ0(Bδ)
≤ P∞(δ)
< α
and therefore (
µ0, µ0|Bcδ
) ∈ Ψ−1µ0.
Moreover, since
Dn(µ0,µ0|Bc
δ
)[B
n
δ ] =
(
µ0|Bcδ
)n
[Bnδ ]
≤ µ0|Bcδ [Bδ]
= 0,
we conclude that the condition (6.1)
inf
(µ0,µ′0)∈Ψ−1µ0
Dn(µ0, µ′0)[Bnδ ] = 0
of Theorem 6.1 is satisfied for all µ0 ∈ A0.
Now consider the diagonal map ∆: M(X )→M(X )×M(X ) defined by
∆(µ) := (µ, µ), µ ∈M(X ).
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Since
Ψ ◦∆(µ) = P0 ◦∆(µ) = µ, for all µ ∈M(X ),
it follows, if we define ∆ on the first component of the productM(X )×M(X ) and then
restrict to A0, that ∆ is a section of Ψ = P0. It is clearly measurable, but also satisfies
Pα ◦∆(µ) = µ, for all µ ∈M(X ),
that is, Pα ◦∆ is the identity map from the first component of M(X ) ×M(X ) to the
second. Then, for µ0 ∈ A0, the positivity of the model P implies that
Dn
(
∆(µ0)
)
[Bnδ ] = Dn0 ◦ Pα
(
∆(µ0)
)
[Bnδ ]
= Dn0 (µ0)[Bnδ ]
= (µ0)
n[Bnδ ]
=
n∏
i=1
µ0[Bδ(xi)]
> 0
so that the second condition (6.2) of Theorem 6.1 is satisfied for all µ0 ∈ A0. Theorem
6.1 then asserts that
U(Ψ−1Π0 Bnδ Dn) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ ◦∆).
Moreover, since
Φ ◦∆ = Φ0 ◦ Pα ◦∆ = Φ0,
now as a function on the first component of M(X )×M(X ), and
Ψ−1Π0 = P−10 Π0 = Π,
we conclude that
U(ΠBnδ Dn) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ0).
The identity U(ΠBnδ Dn) = U(Πα Bnδ Dn0 ) of (8.10) then implies the assertion.
9 Appendix
The following lemma is Lemma III.39 p. 86 of [29]. We also refer to p. 87 of [29] for
the existence of the measurable selection η (which is also derived from Theorem III.38
p.85 of [29]). These results are related to Aumann’s measurable section principle [7] (the
extension to Suslin space is due to Sainte-Beuve [85]).
Lemma 9.1. Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, S a Suslin space. ϕ : T × S → R¯ a
T ⊗ B(S) measurable function and Γ a multifunction (i.e. a set-valued map) from T to
non-empty subsets of S whose graph G belongs to T × B(S). Then
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1. the function
m(t) := sup{φ(t, x) | x ∈ Γ(t)}
is a T̂ -measurable function of t.
2. for δ > 0, there exists η, a T̂ -measurable function of t, such that η(t) ∈ Γ(t) and
ϕ(t, η(t)) > m(t)− δ.
The following definition is Definition 4.50 in [4]:
Definition 9.2. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, and let X and Y be topological
spaces. A function h : S ×X → Y is a Carathe´odory function if:
1. for each x ∈ X, the function hx = h(., x) : S → Y is (Σ,B(Y ))-measurable; and
2. for each s ∈ S, the function hs = h(s, .) : X → Y is continuous.
The following lemma is Lemma 4.51 in [4] (see also [29, p. 70]):
Lemma 9.3. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, X a separable metrizable space, and Y a
metrizable space. Then every Carathe´odory function h : S×X → Y is jointly measurable.
9.1 Universally Measurable Functions
For a topological space T let B̂(T ) denote the σ-algebra of universally measurable sets.
For a measure µ, let µ̂ denote its completion. Here we state the following proposition
that allows us to define the expected value of B̂(T ) measurable functions with respect
to Borel measures. In all statements in the following proposition, the assertions follow
when the integrals involved exist, in particular for semibounded functions. The proof is
straightforward but tedious and follows from e.g. [39, Thm. pg. 37], the English version
of [34, Ch. 2, pg. 49], and [29].
Proposition 9.4. Let T be a topological space. Then we have
• For a measurable function f we have Eµ̂f = Eµf
• Let f be B̂(T )-measurable. Then there exist two measurable functions f and f such
that
f ≤ f ≤ f, µ(f 6= f) = 0
and, for any such functions, we have
Eµ[f ] = Eµ̂[f ] = Eµ[f ]
• For a fixed µ, f 7→ Eµ̂[f ] defines an affine function on the cone of non-negative
B̂(T )-measurable functions
• For a fixed B̂(T )-measurable function f , the function M(T ) 3 µ 7→ Eµ̂[f ] is affine.
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• Suppose that f1, f2 are B̂(T )-measurable non-negative functions such that f1 ≤ f2.
Then Eµ̂[f1] ≤ Eµ̂[f2] for all µ ∈M(T ).
Proposition 9.4 leads to the following definition for the expectation of B̂(T )-measurable
functions with respect to Borel probability measures on T :
Definition 9.5. For a Borel probability measure µ ∈M(T ), we define the integral of a
B̂(T )-measurable function f by
Eµ[f ] := Eµ̂[f ]
when the latter exists, where µ̂ is the completion of the measure µ as described in [39,
p. 37].
Recall that a carrier T for a probability measure Q ∈M(Q) is a set T ∈ B(Q) such
that Q(T ) = 1. For a carrier T , since T ∈ B(Q), it follows that B(T ) = B(Q) ∩ T and
we can define the trace measure QT ∈ M(T ) by QT (A) := Q(A), A ∈ B(Q) ∩ T . The
following proposition shows that the expectation of a function can be defined with respect
to measures which possess carriers upon which the function is universally measurable:
Proposition 9.6. Let S be a topological space. Suppose that f is B̂(T )-measurable for
all measurable T ⊆ S. Suppose also that Q ∈ M(S) has a carrier T ⊆ S. Then, using
Definition 9.5, any such carrier T defines an expectation
EQT [f ] := EQ̂T [f ],
and this definition is independent of the carrier; that is, if T ′ ⊂ S is another carrier,
then
EQ̂T ′ [f ] = EQ̂T [f ].
Moreover, this expectation satisfies the assertions of affinity and monotonicity of Propo-
sition 9.4.
We also need a change of variables formula for expectations of universally measurable
functions.
Proposition 9.7. Let X and Y be topological spaces, Ψ: X → Y a measurable map and
suppose that f : Y → R is B̂(Y ) measurable. Then f ◦ Ψ: X → R is B̂(X)-measurable
and, for pi ∈M(X),
EΨpi[f ] = Epi[f ◦Ψ].
For Suslin space X and a subset M ⊂ M(X ) let Σ(M) denote the smallest σ-
subalgebra of subsets of M for which the the evaluation map ν 7→ ν(B) is measurable
for all B ∈ B(X ). The following version of a result of von Weizsacker & Winkler [97] as
stated in [107, Thm. 3.1] will be useful to us:
Theorem 9.8. Consider a Suslin space X , measurable functions f1, . . . , fn : X → R,
constants c1, . . . , cn ∈ R, and define
H :=
{
ν ∈M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν-integrable and Eν [fi] ≤ ci, for i = 1, . . . , n}
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Then, for each ν ∈ H, there is a probability measure p on Σ(ext(H)) such that
ν(B) =
∫
ext(H)
ν ′(B) dp(ν ′), for all B ∈ B(X ). (9.1)
[107, Prop. 3.1] shows that if a measurable function f : X → R is integrable with
respect to all measures in H (allowing the values ∞ and −∞), then integration
F (ν) :=
∫
X
f dν
is measure affine per Definition 3.3. We need a slightly more general result:
Lemma 9.9. Consider the situation of Theorem 9.8, let f : X → R be a semibounded
universally measurable function. Then
F (ν) := Eν̂ [f ], for ν ∈ H,
is measure affine per Definition 3.3.
The next lemma extends [107, Thm. 2.1] to the case where the constraint functions
fi, for i = 1, . . . , n, are universally measurable:
Lemma 9.10. Let X be Suslin, and fix universally measurable real-valued functions
f1, . . . , fn and constants c1, . . . , cn. Then
H :=
{
ν ∈M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν̂-integrable and Eν̂ [fi] ≤ ci for i = 1, . . . , n} (9.2)
is convex and
ext(H) =
{
ν ∈ H
∣∣∣ ν = m∑
i=1
αiδxi , αi ≥ 0, xi ∈ X , i = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
i=1
αi = 1, 1 ≤ m ≤ n+1,
the vectors
(
f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , fn(xi), 1
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m are linearly independent
}
.
9.2 Proofs
9.2.1 Proof of Proposition 9.6
Let T and T ′ be two carriers for Q ∈ M(S) and f a function such that fT and fT ′ are
B̂(t)- and B̂(T ′)-measurable respectively. Then Proposition 9.4 implies that there are
functions f1, f2 measurable on T and f
′
1, f
′
2 measurable on T
′ such that
f1 ≤ fT ≤ f2 QT (f1 6= f2) = 0
f ′1 ≤ fT ′ ≤ f ′2 QT ′(f ′1 6= f ′2) = 0
70
so that
EQ̂T [fT ] = EQT [f1]
EQ̂T ′ [fT ′ ] = EQT ′ [f
′
1]
Now, it is easy to see that T ∩ T ′ is also a carrier and that we have
f1(x) ≤ f(x) ≤ f2(x), x ∈ T ∩ T ′
and
QT∩T ′(f1 6= f2) ≤ QT (f1 6= f2) = 0
so that we conclude from Proposition 9.4 that
EQ̂T∩T ′ [f ] = EQT∩T ′ [f1]
= EQT [f1]− EQT\T ′ [f1]
= EQT [f1]
= EQ̂T [f ]
and so conclude that
EQ̂T∩T ′ [f ] = EQ̂T [f ].
By the same argument on T ′ we conclude that EQ̂T∩T ′ [f ] = EQ̂T ′ [f ] and therefore the first
assertion is proved. The assertions of affinity and monotonicity are similarly straight-
forward.
9.2.2 Proof of Proposition 9.7
Consider pi ∈M(X) and its pushforward ν := Ψpi. By Proposition 9.4 and the assump-
tions, there exists two measurable functions f and f such that
f ≤ f ≤ f, ν(f 6= f) = 0
from which we conclude that
f ◦Ψ ≤ f ◦Ψ ≤ f ◦Ψ
and
0 = ν[f 6= f ]
= Ψpi[f 6= f ]
= pi[Ψ−1{f 6= f}]
= pi[f ◦Ψ 6= f ◦Ψ]
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so that we obtain
pi[f ◦Ψ 6= f ◦Ψ] = 0 .
Since pi was arbitrary, it follows that f ◦ Ψ is B̂(X)-measurable. To obtain the change
of variables formula, compute
Epi[f ◦Ψ] := Epi[f ◦Ψ]
= Epi[f ◦Ψ]
= EΨpi[f ]
and
EΨpi[f ] := EΨ̂pi[f ]
= EΨpi[f ]
from which we conclude the change of variables formula
Epi[f ◦Ψ] = EΨpi[f ],
which completes the proof.
9.2.3 Proof of Lemma 9.9
Fix ν ∈ H and a probability measure p such that the barycentric formula (9.1) holds.
Proposition 9.4 asserts that there are measurable functions f1 ≤ f ≤ f2 such that
ν(f1 6= f2) = 0. Therefore, f2 − f ≥ 0, Eν̂(f2 − f) = 0, f − f1 ≥ 0, and Eν̂(f − f1) = 0.
Moreover, it is easy to see then we can make both f1 and f2 semibounded. Therefore F
is a well defined extended real valued function. Moreover, [107, Prop. 3.1] asserts that
the function ν 7→ Eν [fi] is measure affine for i = 1, 2, and so
Eν [fi] =
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [fi] dp(ν ′), for i = 1, 2.
Consequently, since ν[f1 6= f2] = 0, it follows that Eν [f2 − f1] = 0 so that
0 = Eν [f2 − f1] =
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [f2 − f1] dp(ν ′), for i = 1, 2,
and since f2 − f1 ≥ 0 it follows that
ν ′[f2 6= f1] = 0, p-a.e.
and therefore
ν̂ ′[f 6= f1] = 0, p-a.e.
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Therefore we conclude that
F (ν) := Eν̂ [f ]
= Eν̂ [f1] + Eν̂ [f − f1]
= Eν̂ [f1]
= Eν [f1]
=
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [f1] dp(ν ′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′ [f1] dp(ν
′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′ [f1] dp(ν
′) +
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′ [f − f1] dp(ν ′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′ [f ] dp(ν
′)
=
∫
ext(H)
F (ν ′) dp(ν ′),
and the assertion is proved.
9.2.4 Proof of Lemma 9.10
Let us first establish that
ν̂1 + ν2 = ν̂1 + ν̂2, for all ν1, ν2 ∈M(X ), (9.3)
α̂ν = αν̂, for all ν ∈M(X ). (9.4)
This follows from the fact that (ν1 + ν2)(N) = 0 if and only if νj(N) = 0 for j = 1, 2
and the characterization of the completion ν̂ by
ν̂(B ∪ S) := ν(B), B ∈ B(X ), S ⊂ N, ν(N) = 0
as found, for example, in [6, p. 18]. For then, for such B and S,
ν̂1 + ν2(B ∪ S) = (ν1 + ν2)(B)
= ν1(B) + ν2(B)
= ν̂1(B ∪ S) + ν̂2(B ∪ S)
Now for the proof of the main assertion. Following the proof of [107, Thm. 2.1], it is
sufficient to show that for
K :=
{
ν ∈M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν̂-integrable for i = 1, . . . , n},
we have
ext(K) := {δx, x ∈ X}, (9.5)
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and that R+K ⊂ R+M(X ) is a lattice cone in its own ordering. For the first, observe
that since ext
(M(X )) = {δx | x ∈ X} and that fi are δx-integrable for all i = 1, . . . , n,
x ∈ X , it follows that
{δx | x ∈ X} ⊆ ext(K).
Now suppose that ν ∈ ext(K) is not a Dirac mass. Then, as in the proof that the
extreme points ofM(X ) are the Dirac masses, see e.g. [4, Thm. 15.9], and using the fact
that the support of ν must contain 2 or more points, we can decompose ν as a convex
combination ν = αν1 + (1− α)ν2 where ν1 6= ν2 and α ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, from
ν̂ = αν̂1 + (1− α)ν̂2,
we conclude that fi being ν̂-integrable implies that fi is ν̂j-integrable for j = 1, 2 and
i = 1, . . . , n. Consequently, νj ∈ K for j = 1, 2. Since ν was an extreme point we
conclude that ν1 = ν2 which is a contradiction, and (9.5) follows.
Now let us demonstrate that R+K is a lattice cone in its own ordering. To that end,
note that by [84, Lem. 10.4], it suffices to show that R+K ⊂ R+M(X ) is a hereditary
subcone, in that ν1 ∈ R+K, ν2 ∈ R+M(X ) and ν1−ν2 ∈ R+K together imply that ν2 ∈
R+K. To that end, consider such ν1 and ν2. Then (9.3) implies that ̂(ν1 − ν2) = ν̂1− ν̂2
and so we conclude that
0 ≤ E ̂(ν1−ν2)[|fi|] = Eν̂1 [|fi|]− Eν̂2 [|fi|]
and therefore
Eν̂2 [|fi|] ≤ Eν̂1 [|fi|] <∞,
from which we conclude that ν2 ∈ R+K. Hence, R+K is a hereditary subcone, and the
assertion then follows as in the proof of [107, Thm. 2.1].
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